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I.   INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an unwed
biological father has a liberty interest in establishing a parental re-
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lationship with his child.1 If the unwed father assumes responsibility
for his child, his interest acquires substantial constitutional protec-
tion.2 The Court has not, however, addressed the issues presented by
recent contested at-birth third-party adoptions. Specifically, the
Court has not determined whether a biological connection alone is
sufficiently fundamental to trigger full constitutional protection
when, through no fault of his own, an unwed biological father has
had no opportunity to take responsibility for his newborn child. This
issue arises in two categories of cases: those involving a father who
finds out about the birth and adoption of his child after adoption
proceedings are filed, and those involving a father who knows the
mother is pregnant with his child and attempts to assume parental
responsibilities during the prenatal period.
When the birth father has been unable to assume his parenting
responsibilities because the child has been placed at-birth with pro-
spective adoptive parents, the biological connection and the father’s
asserted willingness to assume his parenting role should be suffi-
cient to trigger full constitutional protection of his inchoate interest.
Furthermore, Florida should institute the biological rights doctrine
as a rule in contested at-birth adoptions and tailor a statutory adop-
tion scheme that fully protects the inchoate rights of unwed fathers.3
In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. ,4 a recent Florida case involving a
father’s thwarted effort to contest an adoption, illustrates the issues
with contested at-birth adoptions. Gary Bjorklund and Linda, the
biological mother, were unmarried and had lived together for almost
eight months when they conceived Baby Emily.5 Before, and for six
months during the pregnancy, Gary contributed more than half of
the family’s household expenses, including supporting Linda’s two-
                                                                                                                   
1. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1983).
2. See id. at 261.
3. It has long been recognized that states are the arbiters of family law. See Anken-
brandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693-703 (1992) (explaining the domestic relations ex-
ception to federal court jurisdiction); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 120 (1847)
(disavowing federal jurisdiction over custody matters because they are not reducible to pe-
cuniary value, thus leaving such matters to state jurisdiction). Recently, the Supreme
Court has seemed satisfied that states are controlling domestic matters because it has
denied certiorari to several at-birth adoption cases. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W.,
658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 719 (1996); In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d
324 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied 515 U.S. 1152 (1995); In re Adoption of J.J.B., 894 P.2d 994
(N.M. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 168 (1995). Therefore, it is appropriate for Florida to
revise its statutory scheme to protect an unwed father’s inchoate rights and to grant him
greater protection than that afforded by the federal Constitution. See Beagle v. Beagle,
678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996) (holding that the fundamental liberty interest in parent-
ing is specifically protected by Florida’s express constitutional right to privacy and that
such right is a “guarantee of greater protection than is afforded by the federal
[C]onstitution”).
4. 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995), aff’g 647 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
5. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(Farmer, J., dissenting).
1998]                         BIOLOGICAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE 393
year-old son from a previous relationship.6 However, Gary and
Linda’s relationship deteriorated about two months before Emily’s
birth.7 Linda unilaterally planned to place the unborn child for
adoption and moved from the couple’s home.8 Although Gary’s at-
tempts to contact Linda during the last months of the pregnancy
were rejected,9 Linda did allow Gary to accompany her to a sonogram
appointment.10 He was proud of the baby and showed the sonogram
picture to his friends before taping it to his refrigerator.11 Shortly af-
ter that doctor’s appointment, however, Gary received notice of the
impending adoption.12 He immediately phoned Linda’s intermediary
to tell her that he would contest the adoption.13 Thereafter, he
sought legal assistance and filed an acknowledgment of paternity
with HRS.14
Sixteen days before Baby Emily was born, the trial court entered
an ex parte order waiving Gary’s consent of the adoption, stating
that Gary had abandoned Linda and the unborn baby.15 Baby Emily
was born on August 28, 1992, and three days later, she was placed
with the prospective adoptive parents.16 After four evidentiary
hearings, the appointment of an attorney ad litem, and a year’s
passing, the trial court held that Gary “did not exhibit sufficient fi-
nancial or emotional support to the natural mother during the
course of the pregnancy to sustain the position that he did not
‘abandon’ either the natural mother or the unborn child.”17 An en
banc panel affirmed the trial court’s evidentiary findings by a vote of
                                                                                                                   
6. See id. at 920, 941.
7. See id. at 941.
8. See id. at 941-42.
9. See E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 969 (stating that the mother felt that the father’s phone
calls were only made to aggravate her); E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 943 (Farmer, J., concurring)
(stating that after the mother moved out, she tried to avoid the father).
10. See E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 942 (Farmer, J., concurring).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 943.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 963 (Fla. 1995), aff’g 647 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA
1994).
17. E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 943-44 (Farmer, J., concurring). On September 3, Gary filed
a motion to set aside the ex parte order. See id. at 944. Two weeks later, the trial judge set
aside the ex parte order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on whether Gary’s consent
should be waived. See id. At the hearing, the trial court decided that Gary had not aban-
doned the child and refused to waive his consent. See id. The next day, Gary filed a habeas
corpus petition seeking custody of three-month-old Baby Emily. See id. However, the in-
termediary also sought a rehearing on the abandonment issue. See id. The rehearing was
not scheduled until February 1993. See id. Then, after listening to most of the evidence,
the judge set a new date to resume the testimony; the hearing finally resumed on August
3, 1993. See id. at 945. At that hearing, the trial judge held that Gary’s prebirth conduct
was proof that he had abandoned Baby Emily. See id.
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six-to-five and certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court.18
The panel asked whether consideration of the unwed father’s emo-
tional support of the mother during pregnancy was permissible when
determining if the father had abandoned the child.19 After three
years of trial and appellate litigation, the Florida Supreme Court
held that Gary’s emotional and financial support of Linda while she
was pregnant was relevant in determining abandonment.20 This
holding is now the law for contested adoptions in Florida. This
Comment will explain how this rule of law violates the Due Process
Clause of the Federal Constitution. Further, this Comment will ar-
gue that the rule harms the interests of preserving family ties as a
matter of policy and that the Legislature should modify the standard
adopted by the Florida Supreme Court.
To avoid the result reached in E.A.W., an unwed biological father
should be presumed fit to take custody of his newborn child when he
withholds consent to a third-party adoption of the child.21 His efforts
to assume parental responsibility of the child should negate any in-
terests the prospective adoptive parents may have, and his fitness
should be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that ob-
taining custody of the child would be seriously detrimental to the
child’s best interests. Florida should protect the unwed father’s op-
portunity interest by initiating this presumptive right as soon as the
father has made any effort to assume responsibility for the unborn or
newborn child. His emotional support of the mother should be irrele-
vant. He is not seeking to establish a relationship with the mother.
Thus, he should not be held responsible for nurturing a relationship
with the mother when he is not compatible with her.
Florida should institute the biological rights doctrine to eliminate
ambiguous statutory terms that allow the judiciary to waive the
biological father’s consent based on his prenatal conduct towards the
mother. In addition, the state should establish adequate notice pro-
cedures that hold the birth mother responsible for naming, searching
for, and contacting the natural father, and make her a party to the
consent-termination proceedings. The interests of adoptive parents
should not be considered unless the biological father’s rights have
been terminated.
                                                                                                                   
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 967.
21. This Comment does not pertain to unwed fathers who merely wish to block the
adoption of their child by third parties but are not willing to assume full custody of the
child. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 253 (1983) (finding that a putative father could
not block adoption when he only sought a paternity determination, a support order, and
visitation); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 249 (1978) (calling the father’s efforts to es-
tablish paternity and visitation, but not to gain custody, an attempt to acquire “veto
authority”).
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Part II of this Comment distinguishes at-birth adoption cases
from other unwed father cases. Part III explains the biological rights
doctrine and its underlying policies. Part IV reviews the historical
and modern treatment of the rights of biological parents. Part V re-
views several competing interests that have diminished the biologi-
cal rights doctrine. Part VI reviews chapter 63, Florida Statutes , in
the context of the three types of contested at-birth adoption cases to
demonstrate that the current law is unconstitutional. Part VII
makes recommendations for revising chapter 63, Florida Statutes .
Part VIII compares past legislative efforts to these recommenda-
tions. This Comment concludes that legislating a preference for bio-
logical fathers over adoptive parents is one way to ensure due proc-
ess protection for fathers and to provide appropriate constitutional
guidelines in an area that the United States Supreme Court has not
yet addressed.
II.   DISTINGUISHING CONTESTED AT-BIRTH ADOPTION CASES
Contested at-birth adoption cases are best distinguished by con-
trasting the various interests involved in these cases with the inter-
ests involved in prior family law cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court. This comparison makes it clear that an unwed fa-
ther’s liberty interest in a relationship with his newborn child de-
serves full constitutional protection because there is no prevailing
interest involved in a contested at-birth adoption.
A.   Parents’ Rights
In Meyer v. Nebraska ,22 the Court began creating a framework for
constitutionally protecting the interests of married biological23 par-
ents in established, intact family units.24 The Court held that the
federal Constitution gives parents the right to “marry, establish a
home and bring up children,”25 educate their children,26 and make
                                                                                                                   
22. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
23. These opinions relate only to biological parents. The Court did not review consti-
tutional protection afforded to “psychological” parental relationships until 1977. See Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977). In Smith, the Court rec-
ognized that any relationship formed between a foster parent and foster child was subor-
dinate to the interests of biological parents and not deserving of constitutional protection
because it was only a contractual relationship created by the state. See id. at 845-47.
24. See Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together
Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045, 1071-72 (1996). Kaas argues that the federal Constitution pro-
tects two types of family interests. The first is the interest of the family unit in protection
from outside intervention; the second is the interest each individual parent has in estab-
lishing and protecting his parental relationship with his children. See id.
25. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (recognizing the historical significance of family relation-
ships).
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procreation decisions.27 Through the 1970s, the Court expanded
those protections to include family decisions made by unmarried in-
dividuals.28 The Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects all biological parents’ fundamental liberty interests in the
care, custody, and management of their children29 and an unmarried
woman’s privacy interest in procreation decisions.30 Since the 1980s,
the Court has fine-tuned its parents’ rights jurisprudence by examin-
ing a handful of cases that involve state interference with parental
authority,31 and a few cases pitting unwed fathers against their chil-
dren’s biological mothers.32 When analyzed, these cases indicate two
premises: first, the Constitution protects, foremost, the biological
connection between a mother and her child; and second, the Consti-
tution only protects the father’s biological connection with his child
when he has assumed responsibility for the child and when there is
no prevailing state interest to encumber his rights.33
                                                                                                                   
26. See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972) (holding unconstitu-
tional Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance statute when applied to Amish children
educated at home); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding un-
constitutional a statute requiring parents to send their children to public schools). But see
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1066 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that
a requirement that children read certain materials in public schools was not unconstitu-
tional although against the parents’ religious training).
27. See e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding unconsti-
tutional a Connecticut statute that forbade the use of contraceptives by married persons);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding unconstitutional a statute requir-
ing sterilization of certain convicted felons).
28. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the right of personal
privacy encompasses a woman’s qualified right to decide whether or not to have an abor-
tion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972) (relying on Griswold to hold uncon-
stitutional a statutory ban on the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding unconstitutional an Illinois statute
that conclusively presumed that an unmarried father was unfit to have custody of his
child).
29. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a
New York adoption statute that did not require an unwed father’s consent to adoption);
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
30. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
31. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (involving procedural due process
rights in the termination of a mother’s parental rights); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (qualifying a mother’s substantive due process rights in a procreation de-
cision); Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987) (involving an unwed father’s substantive
due process rights in a paternity determination); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)
(incorporating a married parents’ substantive due process rights in termination proceed-
ings); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (determining an unwed father’s procedural due
process rights in a paternity determination).
32. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (holding constitutional a Georgia
adoption statute that applied the “best interests of the child” standard).
33. See Kaas, supra note 24, at 1076. Such interests include the state’s protection of
the welfare of the child and its preference that children be raised in a traditional, two-
parent family setting. See infra Part II.C.
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A biological mother’s rights are based on her unique traditional,
biological, and social relationship with the child.34 That relationship
alone mandates significant constitutional protection.35 A woman has
the constitutional right to determine whether she will abort a fetus,
carry a fetus to term, or place a newborn for adoption.36 Once she
decides to give birth,37 her privacy rights mature into due process
rights that receive full constitutional protection.38 As a result, a
married mother’s right to determine what happens to the fetus, and
the unmarried mother’s right to determine what happens to the fe-
tus and the newborn, are far superior to any protected legal interests
fathers may have in the welfare of their children.39
For the unwed father, the “mere existence of a biological link” be-
tween himself and his child does not receive full constitutional pro-
                                                                                                                   
34. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 853; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16 (“The mother carries and
bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear.”) (quoting Caban, 441
U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring); Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights,
Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 60, 81-85 (1995).
35. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. The Court explained a woman’s liberty interest in her
child:
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical
constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from
the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that
ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot
alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own
vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the
course of our history and our culture.
Id. See also Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The mother carries and
bears the child[;] in this sense her parental relationship is clear.”); In re Adoption of Doe,
543 So. 2d 741, 749 (Fla. 1989) (Barkett, J., concurring) (“I believe that we have correctly
construed and applied ‘abandonment’ . . . [h]owever, the precedent set by this case cannot
carry over into those situations involving the prenatal responsibilities of mothers.”).
36. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
37. See id. at 879 (reaffirming the holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65
(1973), that subsequent to viability, a state may regulate and even proscribe abortion).
38. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 564 (1996) (discussing a mother’s interest in
associational rights with her child); Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (holding invalid a statutory
provision that required consent to an abortion by the husband of the woman seeking the
procedure).
39. The Casey Court made it clear that as between the married father and married
mother, the mother’s decisions regarding the treatment of the fetus are untempered. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 898. The Court stated:
If a husband’s interest in the potential life of the child outweighs a wife’s lib-
erty, the State could require a married woman to notify her husband before
she uses a post-fertilization contraceptive . . . before engaging in conduct
causing risks to the fetus . . . before drinking alcohol or smoking. Perhaps
married women should notify their husbands before using contraceptives or
before undergoing any type of surgery that may have complications affecting
the husband’s interest in his wife’s reproductive organs.
Id. During the short period of time past viability and before birth, the state’s interest in
the fetus overcomes the mother’s authority to choose abortion, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 870,
but she can plan to place the child for adoption.
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tection. Instead, he must promptly and proactively assume respon-
sibility for his child to gain any constitutional protection.40 If the
biological father is married to the natural mother or has been legally
established as the father, he is deemed to have assumed adequate
responsibility for the child and he receives full protection under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.41 However, an unwed
and unestablished biological father has a lesser right—only an op-
portunity interest—regarding the establishment of a relationship
with his child.42 His parental opportunity springs from his unique
biological connection to the child and offers him a chance to establish
a parental relationship, but his rights are not absolute.43 States are
thus required by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to
protect the unwed father’s liberty interest in assuming his parental
role, but in doing so, states may specify exactly what conduct by the
father is necessary to prove his willingness to assume his parental
role.44 Cases reviewed by the Court have set the general parameters
                                                                                                                   
40. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (indicating that an unwed father’s biological connection and his
assumption of responsibility will not overcome the state’s interest in legitimating a child
and providing a child with an intact family unit).
41. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129 (holding that a California statute utilizing an ir-
rebuttable presumption of legitimacy barring paternity proceedings by a putative father
does not violate the putative father’s procedural or substantive due process rights or the
Equal Protection Clause when the child is born into a marital union); Lehr, 463 U.S. at
263 (“The most effective protection of the putative father’s opportunity to develop a rela-
tionship with his child is provided by the laws that authorize formal marriage and govern
its consequences.”); id. at 265 (holding that a biological father’s due process and equal pro-
tection rights were not violated when a New York statute did not allow him to veto adop-
tion by the biological mother’s husband when he had not married the mother or legally
sought to protect his parental rights by filing with the putative father registry); see also In
re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 971 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (stating that Florida law “presumes that a man married to the biologi-
cal mother is in fact the legal father of the child, based in part on the child’s interest in
legitimacy”); Department of HRS v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1993) (explaining
that when a child is born during a marriage, the presumption of legitimacy is so “weighty
that [it] can defeat even the claim of a man proven beyond all doubt to be the biological fa-
ther”); Brown v. Bray, 300 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 1974) (comparing custody rights of pre-
sumed and putative fathers during divorce and paternity actions and construing as consti-
tutional Florida’s paternity statute because, under the statute, a court could award cus-
tody to an unwed father who proved himself fit to take custody).
42. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 256 (explaining that a father’s opportunity interest in a relationship
with his child is constitutionally protected and that state law determines the final out-
come of legal problems arising in familial relationships); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 394 (1979) (holding that not requiring an unwed father’s consent to adoption when he
had formed a relationship with his children violated the Equal Protection Clause); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding that the presumption of an unwed father’s
unfitness violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); see also Adoption of Mi-
chael H., 898 P.2d 891, 894-95, 901 (Cal. 1995) (explaining the relationship between the
Fourteenth Amendment and a California law and holding that because the father had not
taken adequate steps to transform his inchoate interest into a constitutional right that he
was not required to consent to the at-birth adoption of his child).
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of an unwed father’s constitutional rights; however, none of those
cases addressed what protection should be given to a father who,
through no fault of his own, has been unable or has had no
“opportunity” to assume responsibility for his newborn child.
B.   Separating Unwed Fathers From Other Parents
In Stanley v. Illinois,45 Illinois presumed all unwed fathers were
unfit to take or retain custody of their children.46 The Court held that
such a presumption violated the Due Process Clause because it af-
forded him no opportunity to be heard.47 It also violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it treated unwed fathers differently than
married and divorced parents and unmarried mothers.48 In Caban v.
Mohammed,49 New York’s adoption laws required the unwed
mother’s consent to the adoption of a child but not the unwed fa-
ther’s consent.50 The Court held that such a distinction violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it treated unwed fathers who had
an established relationship with their children differently than
similarly situated unwed mothers.51
The Court has also addressed unwed fathers’ attempts to estab-
lish paternity and gain visitation with their children. In Quilloin v.
Walcott,52 the father claimed that the application of the state’s “best
interests standard” in an adoption proceeding commenced by the
biological mother’s husband violated his substantive due process
rights.53 The unwed father was named on the child’s birth certificate,
had often visited with the child, and had provided gifts and other
support for the child.54 After receiving notice of the adoption, he filed
for legitimation and visitation rights.55 The trial court found that
Quilloin lacked standing to contest the adoption because he had not
officially legitimated the child in the eleven years prior to the adop-
tion.56 The court denied his legitimation and visitation petitions and
found that it was in the child’s best interests to grant the adoption.57
                                                                                                                   
45. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
46. See id. at 650.
47. See id. at 657.
48. See id. at 658.
49. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
50. See id. at 385.
51. See id. at 387.
52. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
53. See id. at 254. Quilloin did not challenge his procedural due process rights be-
cause he received notice of the proceedings and was heard on his petitions. See id. at 253.
54. See id. at 248-49, 250. Under the Georgia statute at issue, an unwed father’s con-
sent to adoption was not required unless he had married the mother, acknowledged the
child as his own, or obtained a court order declaring the child legitimate. See id.
55. See id. at 253-54.
56. See id. at 251-52.
57. See id.
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The Supreme Court held that in Quilloin’s case the application of the
best interests standard did not violate his equal protection rights,
and hinged its decision on the fact that Quilloin had never sought an
official custodial relationship with his child.58
In Lehr v. Robertson ,59 the father claimed that New York’s adop-
tion scheme violated his equal protection rights by establishing a
gender-based distinction between unwed mothers and fathers.60 He
also asserted that his due process rights were violated because the
Court did not provide him with prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard.61 A month after the biological mother’s husband commenced
adoption proceedings, Lehr filed for legitimation and visitation.62 He
did not, however, file his name with New York’s putative fathers’
registry.63 Again hinging its decision on their assertion that Lehr
had only minimally attempted to assume responsibility for his
child,64 the Supreme Court agreed with the New York courts that in
Lehr’s case neither his due process or equal protection rights were
violated.65
In Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,66 the Court addressed whether Cali-
fornia’s conclusive presumption of legitimacy violated an unwed fa-
ther’s procedural or substantive due process rights in maintaining
an established relationship with his child.67 The Court reasoned that
Michael’s relationship with his daughter had not been “treated as a
protected family unit under the historic practices of our society” and
that there was no other basis for special protection of his interests
                                                                                                                   
58. See id. at 255-56.
59. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
60. See id. at 254.
61. See id. He further argued that New York’s favoritism toward mothers in the
classification of parents required to consent to an adoption discriminated against unwed
fathers. See id. at 266. Lehr argued that because he had filed for a paternity determina-
tion and visitation that he should have been given notice of the impending final adoption
hearing. See id. at 252.
62. See id. at 252.
63. See id. at 253-54.
64. Lehr did not have a “significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship”
with his child and had not established legal ties to her until she was two years old. Id. at
262.
65. See id. at 268.
66. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
67. See id. at 119-20. The California statutory provision provided that only the mar-
ried father and the mother could rebut their child’s presumption of legitimacy. See id. at
115. Michael H.’s daughter was conceived while the biological mother was married to an-
other man, Gerald D., but paternity tests proved with a 98.07% probability that Michael
was the child’s father. See id. at 114. When the daughter, Victoria, was 18 months old, Mi-
chael filed a paternity action and sought to establish his visitation rights. See id. Michael
was able to visit with Victoria once before filing the paternity action. See id. The mother
often traveled and lived with three different men, including Michael, her husband, and
another man, in various “quasi-family units” during the child’s life. See id. at 114-15. After
the paternity action was filed, the mother and Victoria lived with Michael until the
mother reconciled with her husband. See id. at 115.
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because his paternity arose during the mother’s marriage to another
man.68 Therefore, the Court held that Michael’s interest in maintain-
ing a relationship with Victoria had no constitutional dimensions,
was limited by tradition, and relegated to the states as a matter of
state law.69
These decisions leave the unwed father in a precarious position.
He has a fundamental right to establish a relationship with his
child.70 However, that right is controlled not only by his own con-
duct,71 but also by his legal ties to the biological mother72 and any
prevailing interests asserted by the state.73 While the mother’s inter-
ests in aborting or birthing a child is paramount to the interests of
the biological father, over the past fifty years there have been few
other prevailing interests that may displace the constitutional rights
of unwed fathers who contest the at-birth adoption of their newborn.
Nevertheless, states have tried in various ways to use these interests
to overcome a father’s fundamental right to parent his child.
C.   The State’s Interests
The Meyer line of cases established that a state’s interest in stan-
dardizing the family74 is not significantly substantial to burden
married parents’ fundamental liberty and privacy interests in paren-
tal decision-making.75 However, the Court has recognized that the
state, as parens patriae, may restrict parental authority in an effort
to “guard the general interest in a youth’s well being.”76
                                                                                                                   
68. Id. at 124, 127.
69. See id. at 130.
70. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
72. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128-29 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (asserting that a legal tie to the biological mother may
“appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive constitutional claims might other-
wise exist”).
73. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
74. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-32 (1972) (rejecting standardization
through compulsory education until 16 years old regardless of a family’s religious convic-
tions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (rejecting standardization
through not allowing married couples to decide whether to forego having children); West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (rejecting standardization
through requiring the flag salute in public school when the parents objected on grounds of
being Jehovah’s Witnesses); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (rejecting
standardization through requiring public education rather than private); Meyer, 262 U.S.
at 402 (rejecting standardization through forbidding the teaching of any language other
than English).
75. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (“[T]he State may do much . . . to improve the quality
of its citizens, . . . but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be re-
spected.”).
76. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”).
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In the 1970s, states recognized the latitude of their interests in
protecting the welfare of children and attempted to restrict family
decision-making by unwed fathers in several ways. For example, in
Stanley v. Illinois ,77 the state asserted its interest in protecting “the
moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the
best interests of the community.”78 Illinois claimed that presuming
unwed fathers unfit to take custody of their children would further
that interest.79 However, the Stanley Court reasoned that the state’s
interest in protecting the welfare of children was also served by al-
lowing a fit, unwed father to take custody of his children.80 The Court
held that the state’s irrebuttable presumption of an unwed father’s
unfitness violated Stanley’s due process rights.81
Likewise, in Caban, the state justified requiring a mother’s con-
sent to an adoption while not requiring the unwed father’s consent
by claiming that natural mothers possess a closer relationship with
their children.82 The State asserted that the requirement promoted
the adoption of illegitimate children.83 The Court held that the stat-
ute violated the Equal Protection Clause because neither reason was
sufficient to justify the “inflexible gender-based distinction” in the
statute.84
States have asserted that they have a valid interest in assuring
that children are raised in traditional two-parent family settings.
Quilloin, Lehr, and Michael H. all involved a biological mother in a
family unit with another man.85 This rationale, though, would not
seem to extend to prospective adoptive parents. In Smith v. Organi-
zation of Foster Families ,86 the Court stated that if there was a con-
stitutional protection for the relationship between foster parents and
their foster child,87 it waned in the face of a federal constitutional
                                                                                                                   
77. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). This case concerned an unwed father’s due process right to a
dependency hearing regarding parental fitness before terminating his rights to custody of
his dependent children whose natural mother had died. See id.
78. Id. at 652.
79. See id. at 652, 656-57. The State argued that men are not naturally inclined to
rear children and that putative fathers are generally disinterested in their children. See
id. at 654, nn.5, 6.
80. See id. at 652-53.
81. See id. The Court also reasoned that the administrative and pecuniary burden of
requiring individualized hearings would be slight because “[i]f unwed fathers, in the main,
do not care about the disposition of their children, they will not appear to demand hear-
ings.” Id. at 657 n.9.
82. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979).
83. See id. at 391-92.
84. Id. at 392.
85. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 267-68 (1983); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
86. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
87. See id. at 845. The foster parent relationship is a matter of positive state law and
any expectations and entitlements inherent in that relationship are derived only from
state statutes. See id. at 845-46.
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liberty interest founded in a “blood relationship” and “basic human
right.”88 Like foster parent contracts, adoptions are creatures of state
law. Any interest asserted by adoptive parents should be no greater
than those gained by foster parents. Both interests should be consid-
ered secondary to an interest claimed by a biological parent.
The United States Supreme Court’s unwed father cases leave the
following general rule: an unwed father has a constitutionally pro-
tected right to establish a relationship with his child if the biological
mother decides to give birth to the child and is not married to an-
other man, and if he does not delay assuming his parental role. This
rule supports the premise that an unwed father who promptly as-
serts his interest in his newborn child when the biological mother is
attempting to place his child for adoption at-birth, should be granted
similar constitutional protection to establish a relationship with that
child. The biological rights doctrine would best assure unwed fathers
such constitutional protection.
III.   THE BIOLOGICAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND ITS UNDERLYING
POLICIES
The biological rights doctrine is one of several standards used
across the nation to decide custody cases.89 It provides the most pro-
tection of the rights of biological parents because it presumes that a
child’s welfare is best served under the care and control of a fit bio-
logical parent.90 Because of that underlying presumption, courts are
required to award custody to the biological parent rather than to a
                                                                                                                   
88. Id. at 846.
89. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 972 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (reviewing the three types of “approaches”); Kaas,
supra note 24, at 1064 (explaining “parental rights,” best interests, and the “hybrid” stan-
dards). The “biological rights” doctrine is also called the “parental rights” doctrine, but is
different than the “parental preference” doctrine. See id.; Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Parents
and Strangers: The Uniform Adoption Act Revisits the Parental Rights Doctrine, 30 FAM.
L.Q. 379, 379-80 (1987) (stating that an “overwhelming majority” of jurisdictions utilize
the biological rights doctrine); infra Part V.B. (discussing the “best interests” standard).
90. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The fundamental liberty in-
terest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary cus-
tody of their child to the State.”); Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975)
(stating that parental custody is preferable and will only be refused when it is clearly det-
rimental to the child); In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d. 741, 751 (Fla. 1989) (McDonald,
J., dissenting) (“[H]istory has demonstrated that, unless unfit, the best interests of the
child lies with the natural parents.”); Shorty v. Scott, 535 P.2d 1341, 1344 (N.M. 1975)
(“Parents have a natural and legal right to custody of their children. This right is prima
facie and not an absolute right.”) (quoting Roberts v. Staples, 442 P.2d 788 (N.M. 1968));
United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (No. 15,256) (D. R.I. 1824) (stating that the right
of the father to have custody of his infant child is valid, “[b]ut this is not on account of any
absolute right of the father, but for the benefit of the infant, the law presuming it to be for
his interest to be under the nurture and care of his natural protector, both for mainte-
nance and education”).
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third-party who may assert other interests in the child.91 The court
cannot consider whether a different custodial arrangement would
benefit the child until the biological parent is proven unfit92 and the
court terminates his or her parental rights. Because of its certainty,
the biological rights doctrine serves several constitutional and policy
interests when applied in contested at-birth adoption cases.
A.   The Federal Constitution Requires the Biological Rights Doctrine
in Contested At-Birth Adoptions
When an unwed father contests the at-birth adoption of his child,
the federal Constitution requires application of the biological rights
doctrine. This conclusion follows from analysis of United States Su-
preme Court cases that have held the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects parents’ significant interests in a relationship with their chil-
dren,93 third parties have no liberty interest in a relationship with a
child not biologically connected to them,94 and that the “best inter-
ests of the child” is not a proper standard to determine whether to
terminate a biological parent’s rights.95 Cases involving contested at-
                                                                                                                   
91. See Kaas, supra note 24, at 1065; Lowe, supra note 89, at 380.
92. See DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993) (“Neither [state] law . . . nor
federal law authorizes unrelated persons to retain custody of a child whose natural par-
ents have not been found to be unfit simply because they may be better able to provide for
her future and her education.”); In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill. 1994) (stating that Il-
linois adoption laws “are designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive rights to
their own children wholly apart from any consideration of the so-called best interests of
the child”); William Weston, Putative Fathers’ Rights to Custody—A Rocky Road at Best,
10 WHITTIER L. REV. 683, 685 (1989); see also Harden v. Thomas, 329 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla.
1st DCA 1976) (recognizing that courts have consistently held that a natural parent can-
not be deprived of custody unless proven unfit); In re Adoption of J.J.B., 894 P.2d 994,
1002 (N.M. 1995) (explaining New Mexico’s presumptive abandonment statute that re-
quires a finding of unfitness before allowing a nonparent to take custody of a child) (citing
Shorty v. Scott, 535 P.2d 1341, 1344 (N.M. 1975)).
93. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 564 (1996) (determining that a biological
mother has a fundamental right to take custody of her child and that she cannot be denied
an appeal of termination of her parental rights when she cannot pay for the filing and
copying costs of the appeal); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (1982) (“[T]he interest
of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come
within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and free-
dom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that the rights to conceive and raise
children are “basic civil rights of man”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(deeming the rights to conceive and to raise one’s children essential).
94. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-46 (1977)
(explaining that a foster parent’s relationship with a foster child is a state-created, con-
tractual relationship, and if such a relationship created any liberty interest, such interest
would still have to give way to the biological parents’ rights that are derived “from blood
relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human right[s]”).
95. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993) (reviewing a facial challenge to an
Immigration and Naturalization Service regulation governing the release of detained
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birth adoptions are analogous to the case of Stanley v. Illinois .96 In
Stanley, the only countervailing state interest was the state’s desire
to protect the welfare of children.97 As the Stanley Court opined, the
state’s interest would be served, rather than hampered, by awarding
a fit, unwed biological father custody of his children.98 Thus, the fed-
eral Constitution requires adherence to the biological rights doctrine
in contested at-birth adoption cases because the unwed father has a
fundamental right in his parental relationship, and the state has no
substantial interest that would justify burdening that right.
B.   The Biological Rights Doctrine Furthers State Social, Economic,
and Administrative Interests
In addition to being required by the Federal Constitution, the
biological rights doctrine serves certain state social, economic, and
administrative interests. First, the biological rights doctrine pre-
vents the state from social engineering, which is inherent in making
a “best interests” judgment.99 Generally, prospective adoptive par-
                                                                                                                   
alien juveniles); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (“[The]
Court more than once has adverted to the fact that the ‘best interests of the child’ stan-
dard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively encourage them to rely on their
own personal values.”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith, 431 U.S. at
862-63 (Stewart, J., concurring).
The Reno court addressed whether the juvenile detainees had a right to an individual-
ized hearing on whether private custodial arrangements would be in the child’s best inter-
ests. See Reno, 507 U.S. at 303. The Court flatly stated that the best interests of the child
is a proper standard for making a custody decision between two parents but that it is not
the “sole criterion—much less the sole constitutional criterion—for other, less narrowly
channeled judgments involving children.” Id. at 304. The Court opined: “Even if it were
shown, for example, that a particular couple desirous of adopting a child would best pro-
vide for the child’s welfare, the child would nonetheless not be removed from the custody
of its parents so long as they were providing for the child adequately.” Id. The Quilloin
Court stated:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended “[i]f a
State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objec-
tions of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and
for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best inter-
est.”
Quillion, 434 U.S. at 255 (quoting Smith, 431 U.S. at 862-63 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
96. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
97. See id. at 652.
98. See id. at 652-53.
99. See In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182-83 (Ill. 1994) (“If best interests of the child
were a sufficient qualification to determine child custody, anyone with superior income,
intelligence, education, etc., might challenge and deprive the parents of their right to their
own children.”); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992) (“[W]ithout established
procedures to guide courts in such matters, they would ‘be engaged in uncontrolled social
engineering.’ This is not permitted under our law; ‘[c]ourts are not free to take children
from parents simply by deciding another home offers more advantages.’”) (citing In re
Burney, 259 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1977)); Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn.
1994) (“Biological bonds should not be so lightly brushed aside, and the courts should not
be given a license to engage in social engineering by invoking the ‘best interests of the
child.’”).
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ents are in a higher social class than the birth parents,100 and courts
may tend to make parental rights termination decisions based on
what the adoptive parents can offer the child compared to what the
biological parents can provide.101 The Supreme Court has consis-
tently recognized that a state’s interest in attempting to standardize
its families to conform to some “state-designed ideal”102 is really no
interest at all.103
Further, third-party adoptions may have ill effects on the children
subjected to them. At some point in their lives, adoptees face the is-
sue that their biological parents gave them up for adoption. The
child may suffer psychological problems as a result of the adoption
and separation from her biological parents.104 These difficult issues
are not always resolved105 and may be more difficult when the adop-
tee knows that a court forced a biological parent to surrender his pa-
                                                                                                                   
100. See Susan A. Munson, Independent Adoption: In Whose Best Interest?, 26 SETON
HALL L. REV. 803, 812 (1996) (discussing the rise in independent adoptions and partially
attributing the rise to fact that, under the New Jersey adoption statute, adoptive parents
provide financial assistance to the birth parent, such as medical and hospital costs, food,
clothing, and shelter expenses, and payment of vocational, religious, or psychological
counseling). See also Smith, 431 U.S. at 833 (“From the standpoint of natural parents . . .
foster care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion into the family life of the
poor.”).
Both the federal and state laws governing an adoption require an evaluation of the pro-
spective adoptive parents’ financial status. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-203 (amended
1994), 9 U.L.A. 21-22 (Supp. 1997) (requiring a preplacement evaluation of adoptive par-
ents’ educational and employment history, property and income, credit report or financial
statement, and the quality of the environment in the home); FLA. STAT. § 63.092 (2)(c)-(d)
(1997) (requiring a preliminary home study that includes “[a]n assessment of the physical
environment of the home” and “a determination of the financial security of the intended
adoptive parents”).
101. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 979 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority’s acceptance of the “lack of
emotional support” standard because it will lead to discrimination against the less fortu-
nate); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241 (“[C]ourts are not free to take children from parents
simply by deciding another home offers more advantages.”).
102. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 452 (1990) (holding unconstitutional a Min-
nesota abortion statute that required parental consent from both parents before a minor
could obtain an abortion). The Hodgson court added that “a state interest in standardizing
its children and adults, making the ‘private realm of family life’ conform to some state-
designed ideal, is not a legitimate state interest at all.” Id.
103. See discussion supra Part II.C.
104. See, e.g., Adoption: Assistance Information Support (visited Nov. 14, 1997)
<http://www.adopting.org/commonis.html>. Adoptees may not feel like they belong to the
adoptive family and may have problems in identity development, may be ambivalent to-
ward their adoptive parents, may suffer from low self-esteem and learning disabilities,
may have feelings of rejection, shame, guilt, and unresolved grief, may have problems in
acclimatizing to the culture of their adoptive family, and may tend to fantasize about their
past and reunion prospects. See id.
105. Many of the psychological problems are unresolved through the life of the adop-
tee, while some progress may be made resolving other issues. See id. For example, most
states make adoption records accessible to the adoptee so that the adoptee can at least
have relevant health histories.
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rental rights.106 Adherence to the biological rights doctrine would al-
low adoptions only in those cases where both biological parents
knowingly and voluntarily relinquished their rights, extracting the
state from the social engineering process.
Second, the biological rights doctrine confirms that the rights of
biological parents are firmly rooted in natural law, religion,107 and
social dictates.108 Natural law places the child under the authority of
his biological parents for protection, education, and socialization.109
As one court has noted, “it would be repugnant to the natural law to
deprive a parent of the right to rear his children, except for the most
grave reasons.”110 The biological connection deserves considerable
autonomy because it is “one of the oldest institutions known to
mankind and forms the basic unit of our society.”111 The Legislature
should mandate that the child’s welfare is best guarded by leaving
the child where natural law and society found her—with her biologi-
cal parents.
Third, presuming that a biological parent is fit brings adoption
contests to finality by simplifying termination proceedings. The state
has an interest in promoting the finality of adoptions and relieving
the fiscal burden of litigation.112 If the biological father knows about
the pregnancy, promptly contests the adoption, and is presumed fit
to take custody, the adoption contest could end at the initial waiver
of consent hearing. The presumption would allow the trial judge to
focus on whether the father took any steps to contest the adoption af-
ter he became aware of the proceedings. Such actions as filing a pa-
ternity acknowledgment,113 requesting a paternity test,114 phoning in-
                                                                                                                   
106. See E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 979 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(stating that the unwed father’s rights were never appropriately terminated); In re Adop-
tion of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (Stevenson, J., dissenting)
(“It is but a matter of time before this child will learn of his adoption and wonder why. All
that can be said to him is that, even though your [father] wanted you, the adoptive par-
ents and the courts would not let [him] have you . . . .” ).
107. See infra notes 135-136.
108. See Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975) (justifying the court’s
acceptance of the biological rights doctrine because of natural law).
109. See id. at 1055 (Dimond, J., concurring) (stating that the guiding principle behind
Alaska following the biological rights doctrine is “the fundamental natural right of parents
to nurture and direct the destiny of their children”).
110. Id.; see Shorty v. Scott, 535 P.2d 1341, 1344 (N.M. 1975) (“Parents have a natural
and legal right to custody of their children.”).
111. Turner, 540 P.2d at 1055-56.
112. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264-65 (1983) (discussing and recognizing
New York’s interest in facilitating adoption of children and expeditiously completing pro-
ceedings); Joan Hiefetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter’s Ruminations, 30
FAM. L.Q. 345, 365 n.62 (1996) (discussing the reasons why the Uniform Adoption Act
(UAA) limits the time period for appeals or other challenges and stating that the state has
an interest in promoting the finality of adoptions).
113. See Scott A. Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: Defining the Rights of Un-
wed Fathers in Newborn Adoptions, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 363, 424 (1996) (advocating
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termediaries to express refusal to consent,115 and informing the birth
mother or adoptive parents of his refusal to consent116 would trigger
the father’s custodial rights. If there is no evidence to rebut the fa-
ther’s parental fitness, the proceeding would end, and the father
would take custody of the child.117
Fourth, the biological rights doctrine encourages individual re-
sponsibility by allowing the birth father to assume the burden of
caring for, nurturing, and supporting his child. Recently, the
“responsible fatherhood” movement118 has formed to rebut national
criticism119 of fathers as “dead-beats”120 or “absent fathers.”121 In-
creasingly, unwed fathers are demanding to be recognized as valued
care givers rather than just financial supporters of their children.
The biological rights doctrine, adhered to over a series of cases and
                                                                                                                   
for a putative father registry to protect unwed father’s interest); Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc.
Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 639-40 (Utah 1990) (holding constitutional Utah’s paternity regis-
tration statute and affirming the termination of the unwed father’s rights because he did
not file with the registry within four days of the child’s birth).
114. See T.J.B. v. E.C., 652 A.2d 936, 940 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (concerning a father’s
doubt that a child was his until testing confirmed his paternity).
115. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(Farmer, J., concurring) (noting that the father called an intermediary and told the bio-
logical mother that he would not consent to the adoption).
116. See id.; T.J.B., 652 A.2d at 940 (noting that after the paternity determination, the
father wrote a letter to the prospective adoptive parents, informing them that he would
not consent to the adoption).
117. See In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 339 (Ill. 1995) (issuing a writ of habeas cor-
pus and ordering the child delivered to his unwed father); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239,
241 (Iowa 1992) (ordering custody of the baby to be transferred to the father).
118. See Stephanie Goldberg, Make Room for Daddy, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at 48
(discussing changes in the fathers’ movement such as joining forces with second wives,
grandparents, and noncustodial mothers that have made it more mainstream); National
Fatherhood Initiative (visited Nov. 13, 1997) <http://www.register.com/father>; Center for
Successful Fathering, Promoting the Benefits of Involved Fathers (visited Nov. 13, 1997)
<http://www.fathering.org>.
119. Some of this criticism has come from feminists. See Nancy D. Polikoff, The Delib-
erate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It An Option for Lesbian and Hetero-
sexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375, 376 (1996). For example, Polikoff states:
Contrary to the ideology that simultaneously glorifies fathers and vilifies
mothers, I want women to have the option to form families in which their chil-
dren have no fathers. This is a hard position to develop without acknowledging
a larger social context of male indifference to the consequences of sexual inter-
course and male irresponsibility for the economic well-being of the children
they sire.
Id.
120. Department of HHS, The Clinton Record on Child Support (visited Nov. 13, 1997)
<http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/CSE/new/fswrcse.html> (discussing President Clinton’s pro-
gram to collect child support).
121. DAVID BLACKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT
SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995) (concluding that if current trends continue, unwed parenthood
will become the nation’s principal cause of fatherlessness); Marty Dart, Statistics About
Deadbeat Dads and the Effects of Absent Fathers (visited Nov. 13, 1997)
<http:/www.vix.com/pub
/men/nofather/dart.html>.
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strengthened by a United States Supreme Court decision, would
send a message to unwed fathers that if they “step up”122 and assume
any responsibility for their children they will be recognized as fit
custodians.
Finally, the biological rights doctrine places the father on a more
level playing field with the mother.123 Knowing that the father may
obtain custody, the mother may be honest about the pregnancy, put
the matter in the open rather than obscuring her plans, and try to
work through the issue with the father without resorting to adop-
tion.
IV.   THE CURRENT STATE OF THE BIOLOGICAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
A.   Historical Treatment of Biological Rights
At English common law, statutory adoption was nonexistent.124
Custody litigation was rare and children were considered nothing
more than economic resources and chattel.125 Children were to be
“born, raised, schooled in religion, and, as soon as they were produc-
tive, put to useful labor.”126 Married fathers had broad authority over
their children, their rights to them were preeminent,127 and they
were expected to financially support, maintain, train, and control
them.128 Society and the law expected married mothers to care for
and comfort the children but afforded them no legal rights to the
children.129 On the other hand, illegitimate children were considered
                                                                                                                   
122. John E. Fennelly, Step Up or Step Out: Unwed Fathers’ Parental Rights Post-Doe
and E.A.W., 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 259, 296, 310-11 (1996) (characterizing decisions made
in recent national adoption contests as a newly forming policy of requiring unwed fathers
to “step up or step out”).
123. Cf. Daniel Amneus, Ph.D., MacKinnon, Dworkin, The New Victorians (visited
Nov. 13, 1997) <http://www.vix.com/pub/men/nofather/articles/amneus.html> (“The bio-
logical weakness of the father’s role is not a reason for throwing fathers out of the family
but a reason for strengthening their role within it.”).
124. See In re Adoption of Palmer, 129 Fla. 630, 633, 176 So. 537, 538 (1937); Harden
v. Thomas, 329 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
125. See The Etna, 8 F. Cas. 803, 804 (No. 4542) (D.C. Me. 1838) (discussing the his-
tory of paternal power over children); Weston, supra note 92, at 685 (stating that the
courts resolved custody disputes only when there was provable and serious harm to the
safety of the child).
126. Judith T. Younger, Responsible Parents and Good Children, 14 LAW & INEQ. 489,
496 (1996).
127. See, e.g., Bonsack v. Campbell, 134 Fla. 809, 811-12, 184 So. 332, 333 (1938); In re
Weaver v. Hamans, 118 Fla. 230, 231, 159 So. 31, 32 (1935); Miller v. Miller, 38 Fla. 227,
231, 20 So. 989, 990 (1896); Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 688 (Ala. 1981).
128. See Respublica v. Keppele, 2 U.S. 197, 198 (Pa. 1793) (holding that a child could
be apprenticed to a master for education but could not be sold into slavery by his father);
United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946, 946 (No. 14,497) (D. Mass. 1816); Etna, 8 F.
Cas. at 804; United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (No. 15,256) (D. R.I. 1824); Younger,
supra note 126, at 496; Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375,
398 (1996).
129. See Younger, supra note 126, at 496; Weston, supra note 92, at 686.
410 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:391
the children of no one, made charges of the community, and often
apprenticed to masters.130 Mothers and fathers of illegitimate chil-
dren were prosecuted for fornication.131
Only some of these ideas were accepted in the new America.132
American law recognized the needs of children and shifted away
from the concept of children as property.133 While the biological
rights doctrine was recognized under the common law,134 natural
law,135 and religion,136 American courts relied upon the states’ sover-
eign power and their own equity power to make custody decisions
contrary to absolute parental authority.137 The “child’s best interests”
became the American rule in custody disputes between biological
parents of legitimate and illegitimate children.138 By the early nine-
                                                                                                                   
130. See Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. at 946; Younger, supra note 126, at 496; Sanger, supra
note 128, at 397-99. Legitimate children were also apprenticed during colonial times. See
Sanger, supra note 128, at 397. Most parents apprenticed children for economic reasons,
but wealthy parents placed their children to teach them the value of work. See id. Ap-
prenticing, in fact, was a form of common law adoption. See id. Mothers transferred cus-
tody of their illegitimate children to others whom they felt could better educate and train
them. See id.
131. See Younger, supra note 126, at 496.
132. See Etna, 8 F. Cas. at 804 (comparing savage and Roman law to the American
rules of a father’s authority over his children).
133. See id. at 806 (noting that a child does not become the property of his parents
based on the child’s birth, but “becomes a member of the human family, . . . invested with
all the rights of humanity”).
134. See Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. at 949:
By the common law, the father has a right to the custody of his children during
their infancy. In whatever principle this right is founded, whether it result
from the very nature of parental duties, or from that authority, which devolves
upon him, by reason of the guardianship by nature, or nurture, technically
speaking, its existence cannot now be brought into controversy.
Id.
135. See Etna, 8 F. Cas. at 806; Mauro v. Ritchie, 16 F. Cas. 1171, 1172 (No. 9312) (D.
D.C. 1827).
Nature has placed [the child] under the tutelage of the parent, because this tu-
telage is necessary for his protection and well-being, and has implanted in the
bosom of the parent the instinct of parental love as a pledge and security for
the faithful and pious execution of the trust . . . .
Id.
136. See Etna, 8 F. Cas. at 806 (“We find traces of this paternal power in the pictures
which the Bible gives of the simple manners of the primitive and patriarchal ages of the
world.”); Deuteronomy 21:18-21 (giving parents the authority to have stubborn sons
stoned).
137. The equity jurisdiction of the American courts stemmed from the king’s preroga-
tive under parens patriae to protect his subjects, which dates to seventeenth century
England. See Weston, supra note 92, at 688 (citing H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 786 (1988)). Parens patriae means “parent of the coun-
try.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (6th ed. 1990). The term “was used to describe the
power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property inter-
ests and the person of the child.” United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 32 (No. 15,256) (D.
R.I. 1824) (explaining why the English courts, exercising the power of the king, were al-
lowed to remove children from the custody of their father).
138. See, e.g., Green, 26 F. Cas. at 31 (stating that the right of the father to have cus-
tody of his infant child is true, “[b]ut this is not on account of any absolute right of the fa-
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teenth century, state courts began to recognize the significance of the
biological connection.139 As to legitimate children, the biological pref-
erence was recognized for both parents as against third parties, and
the tender years doctrine arose to settle custody disputes over young
children between equally fit parents.140 The courts also used fault to
determine which of two divorcing parents should take custody of a
child and, in their decision, considered any neglect, cruelty, or aban-
donment by either parent as reasons to award custody to one parent
over the other.141
For illegitimate children, the mother’s biological connection
meant that she was the child’s natural guardian and had an absolute
right to custody over the putative father and third parties.142 The
mother, though, could be deprived of custody for egregious conduct,143
or she could voluntarily relinquish custody of her child to someone
who promised to care for him.144 A biological father, on the other
hand, had no custodial rights to his illegitimate child, nor a duty to
support him, until it was proven that he was the child’s father.145 A
                                                                                                                   
ther, but for the benefit of the infant, the law presuming it to be for his interest to be un-
der the nurture and care of his natural protector, both for maintenance and education”).
139. See Hadley v. City of Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 439, 65 So. 545, 546 (1914)
(holding that the mother of an illegitimate child has a right to sue for the wrongful death
of her illegitimate child under Florida’s 1899 wrongful death act); Adams v. Sneed, 41 Fla.
151, 161-62, 25 So. 893, 895 (1899) (construing Florida’s 1829 inheritance statute and
holding that illegitimate children of slave mothers can inherit from their mother).
140. See Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 527, 23 So. 2d 623, 625 (1945); Fields v. Fields,
143 Fla. 886, 890, 197 So. 530, 531 (1940); Miller v. Miller, 38 Fla. 227, 230, 20 So. 989,
990 (1896); Anderson v. Anderson, 289 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (stating that
the evolution of law over several centuries indicated that everything else being equal,
mothers of infants in tender years should receive custody). But see FLA. STAT. §
61.13(2)(b)(1) (1997) (“[T]he father of the child shall be given the same consideration as
the mother in determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of
the child.”).
141. See, e.g., Howard v. Department of HRS, 651 So. 2d 201, 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995);
Miller, 38 Fla. at 230, 20 So. at 990 (reversing a custody award of children to the mother
because the mother abandoned the marital home and the father had not been proven un-
fit); State ex rel. Meredith v. Meredith, 69 N.Y.S.2d 462, 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947)
(granting custody of an illegitimate child to the father because the mother was a convicted
bigamist and had abandoned the child).
142. See Marshall v. Reams, 32 Fla. 499, 501, 14 So. 95, 96 (1893) (“The mother has
the superior legal right over all others to the custody and control of her minor, illegitimate
child.”); State v. Nestaval, 75 N.W. 725, 725 (Minn. 1898) (“[A]s against the mother of a
bastard child, the putative father has no legal right to its custody, but the mother, as its
natural guardian, is entitled to its control, and is bound to maintain it.”); Bustamento v.
Analla, 1 N.M. 255, 261 (N.M. 1857) (“[T]he mother is natural guardian of her illegitimate
children, and she is bound to maintain them.”); Burns v. Commonwealth, 18 A. 756, 757
(Pa. 1889) (“[T]he mother of such a[n] [illegitimate] child has the paramount right to the
custody of it.”).
143. See, e.g., Meredith, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
144. See Marshall, 32 Fla. at 501, 14 So. at 96 (noting that the mother transferred the
custody of her 16-year-old child from the child’s uncle to a local doctor).
145. See Nestaval, 75 N.W. at 725 (“At common law the putative father is under no le-
gal liability to support his illegitimate offspring.”); Bustamento, 1 N.M. at 255. See also In
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mother or a state actor could bring bastardy proceedings to deter-
mine paternity and force the father to support and maintain the il-
legitimate child.146 What began as criminal punishment for fornica-
tion became a civil proceeding “to impose the onus of supporting a
child upon its natural parent to prevent the child from becoming a
dependent upon society.”147 States recognized that such proceedings
relieved them and the community from providing financial aid to the
child and used the proceedings well into the 1900s.148
By the beginning of the 1900s, almost all states had enacted
adoption statutes.149 Those statutes supported the mother’s auton-
omy over her illegitimate children because it was believed that she
alone could determine which custodial arrangement best served the
interests of the child.150 The laws presumed that a father was unfit to
take custody of his child and did not require his consent to, or notice
to him, of custody or adoption proceedings.151 A father could guaran-
                                                                                                                   
re Remske, 160 N.Y.S. 715, 716 (N.Y. 1916) (finding that the mother’s husband was not a
guardian of the child and, thus, did not have a duty to support the child).
146. See, e.g., Nestaval, 75 N.W. at 726; Ex parte Hayes, 25 Fla. 279, 281-82, 6 So. 64,
64 (1889).
147. Minnesota v. Carmena, 189 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Minn. 1971) (deciding jurisdictional
requirement for bastardy proceeding); see Weston, supra note 92, at 690. Although states
claimed that bastardy proceedings were civil and not criminal, the results were basically
the same. See Nestaval, 75 N.W. at 726; Hayes, 25 Fla. at 282, 6 So. at 64 (proceeding is
“quasi-criminal”). Florida’s bastardy statute required the mother to file a complaint with
the justice of the peace accusing a named person of being the father. See Hayes, 25 Fla. at
281, 6 So. at 64. If the justice of the peace found that there was sufficient evidence, he is-
sued an order for the arrest of the accused. See id. at 281-82, 6 So. at 64. Upon first ap-
pearance, the putative father could make bond and be released until the arraignment. See
id. at 282, 6 So. at 64. If found guilty, the court ordered the father to pay a set sum for a
period of time. See id., 6 So. at 64. In Hayes, the father was found guilty and ordered to
pay $25 a year for 10 years, until the child was 12. See id., 6 So. at 64. The father was
taken into custody until he secured a bond to secure that sum. See id., 6 So. at 64. Upon
the father’s writ of habeas corpus, the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over the case because the mother’s petition did not allege that she was
not a married woman when the baby was born. See id. at 283, 6 So. at 65.
148. See, e.g., Nestaval, 75 N.W. at 725 (“[T]he [paternity] statute makes the putative
father one in law for a particular purpose, viz. for the indemnity of society against the ex-
pense of the support of the child . . . .”).
149. See Younger, supra note 126, at 497. Massachusetts passed the first adoption
statute in 1851. See id. Prior to that time, families had taken care of children other than
their own but there was no legal mechanism for making them an official, legal family
member. See id.
150. See supra note 142.
151. See Clements v. Banks, 159 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (stating that the
fact that the father voluntarily supported his illegitimate child gave him no standing to
prevent the adoption); In re Remske, 160 N.Y.S. 715, 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1916) (holding
that the wife could take custody of her illegitimate child because her husband was not le-
gally obligated to support the child and was not his custodian); Nestaval, 75 N.W. at 725
(finding the father had no legal right to custody of the bastard child).
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tee his rights to his children only by marrying the birth mother or
having paternity established in a bastardy proceeding.152
B.   Modern Treatment of Biological Rights and Case Law
Supporting the Biological Rights Doctrine
Only in the past twenty-five years have unwed biological fathers
enjoyed any constitutional protection of their parental rights.153 The
development of those rights, like other social transformations, has
been slow and arduous. Although the diversity and inconsistency of
recent case law makes it difficult to generalize about the present
state of unwed fathers’ rights,154 there are several contested at-birth
adoption decisions that have applied the biological rights doctrine.155
In those cases, the biological father was presumed fit and awarded
custody of his child.156 The fathers had never been provided an op-
portunity to assume parental responsibility for their children be-
cause the mothers lied to them either about the paternity or the
placement of the child.157 These contesting fathers gained custody of
their children,158 and the courts seemed comfortable with the result
because it was the mothers’ bad deeds, not the fathers’ inaction, that
deprived the fathers of the opportunity to develop a parental rela-
tionship.159
                                                                                                                   
152. See Hayes v. Strauss, 144 S.E. 432, 434 (Va. 1928) (“On legitimation, the child is
subject to the custody and control of the father to the same extent as in the case of a le-
gitimate child.”).
153. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972) (requiring a fitness hearing be-
fore a biological father’s rights were terminated).
154. See Kaas, supra note 24, at 1064 n.70 (stating that it is not feasible to determine
a standard by which each state must decide custody issues).
155. See In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 339 (Ill. 1995) (following the biological rights
doctrine when the mother had told the father that the child died); In re B.G.C., 496
N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992) (following the biological rights doctrine to award the child to
the natural father when the mother had named another man as the child’s father); In re
Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E. 2d 418, 428 (N.Y. 1990) (remitting the case to the trial court for
determination of whether the unwed father had manifested sufficient parental responsi-
bility to satisfy the biological rights doctrine); Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 680
(Tenn. 1994) (following the biological rights doctrine when the father filed with the regis-
try but did not receive notice of the adoption proceedings).
156. See supra note 155.
157. See, e.g., In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill. 1994) (noting that the mother told
the father that the baby had died rather than admitting that she surrendered the child for
adoption); B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 240-41 (noting that the mother identified a different man
as the father and that man had erroneously signed a consent to the adoption); Nale, 871
S.W.2d at 675 (noting that the mother lied to the father and surrendered the child without
the father’s knowledge).
158. See, e.g., Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182; B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241; Nale, 871 S.W.2d at
680.
159. See Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 333 (writ of habeas corpus) (noting that unwed fa-
thers who, “through deceit, are kept from assuming responsibility for and developing a
relationship with their children, are entitled to the same due process rights as fathers
who actually are given an opportunity and do develop this relationship”).
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V.   COMPETING INTERESTS TO THE BIOLOGICAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Unfortunately, the biological rights doctrine has not been applied
in a majority of recent cases. Instead, courts have used another
standard by which to judge unwed father contested adoption cases—
the best interests standard. As previously discussed, the best inter-
ests standard is not constitutional when applied to contested at-birth
adoptions because it is a subjective standard that deprives the un-
wed father of his opportunity interest before giving him the chance
to pursue it.160 Nonetheless, the current trend seems to be toward the
best interests standard,161 and there are two sociological factors that
are widening acceptance of that standard.
A.   Sociological Factors
First, the social recognition of a mother’s autonomy in pregnancy
decisions has been a detriment to the rights of biological fathers.162
Mothers have held a special, exalted status in our society for centu-
ries, and their unique ability to give birth is revered in society, relig-
ion, and the law.163 Holding women in such an exalted status per-
petuates stereotypes that men are inadequate care givers and
minimizes their parental role and decision-making power.164 This
                                                                                                                   
160. See supra Part II.
161. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT Prefatory Note (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1997)
(“The Act . . . promotes the interest of minor children in being raised by individuals who
are committed to, and capable of, caring for them.”); Kaas, supra note 24, at 1065-66. This
current label, though, confuses the types of cases that should be decided under the best in-
terests standard. The standard first emerged, and is currently the standard used, to settle
custody decisions between parents. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (No.
15,256) (D. R.I. 1824) (“When, therefore, the court is asked to lend its aid to put the infant
into the custody of the father, and to withdraw him from other persons, it will look into all
the circumstances, and ascertain whether it will be for the real, permanent interests of
the infant . . . .”). It is not necessarily an appropriate standard to use when deciding be-
tween a biological parent and a third party.
Commentators also claim that there is a third standard used by some states—the
“parental preference” standard. See Kaas, supra note 24, at 1064-67 (categorizing three
standards and explaining the burden of proof in each); In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658
So. 2d 961, 972-73 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(discussing three approaches to deciding contested adoption cases and categorizing the
UAA as a variation of the best interests and biological rights standards).
162. See Shanley, supra note 34, at 62-63.
163. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text; Weston, supra note 92, at 690
(“Even though today, the mater[nal] preference rule and its alter ego, the tender years
doctrine, have been largely abolished, the abolition of the emotional dedication of judges
to its application has not been so easily eradicated.”).
164. If the rights of a mother and father are compared, it becomes evident that it is of-
ten more difficult to terminate a biological mother’s rights than a biological father’s rights.
A third-party petitioner against a mother must prove her severely unfit. See, e.g., Murphy
v. Markham-Crawford, 665 So. 2d 1093, 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (holding that a mother
who relinquished custody of her six-year-old daughter to the paternal grandmother for six
years was not proven unfit); In re Adoption of M.A.H., 411 So. 2d 1380, 1384 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1982) (holding that a mother, whom HRS found to be unfit, could contest an adoption
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reverence is evident in various statutory provisions for notice, con-
sent, and termination of the father’s rights, and in the way Florida
courts have interpreted abandonment.165
The second major obstacle has been the courts’ implicit and ex-
plicit reliance on their personal beliefs about who should raise chil-
dren.166 A judge makes decisions based on a natural thought process
in which he relies on “beliefs (though they are not in evidence) which
he reasonably thinks he shares with other intelligent persons as to
the general nature of things—the meanings of ordinary words, typi-
cal modes of human behavior, causal relations between commonplace
events, and the like.”167 In the contested adoption context, such a
process colors judicial decisions regarding whether a biological fa-
ther’s rights should be terminated by preferring the adoptive, or
“psychological,” parents because they are better off financially than
the birth parents and, to the judicial mind, have more to offer the
child.
                                                                                                                   
by the paternal grandparents who had “temporary” custody for five years); Foster v.
Sharpe, 114 So. 2d 373, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959) (reversing the trial court’s order of cus-
tody with the paternal aunt in favor of the mother, after the mother had left her 11-year-
old daughter with the paternal aunt for six years).
165. See supra text accompanying note 20.
166. See generally Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out . . .” An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1548 (1987). Davis conducted an
empirical study on the effects of “judicial absorption” of the “psychological best interest”
theory. See id. at 1546-47. The psychological best interest theory was first espoused in
1963 and argued that disrupting the psychological relationship a child has with an adult
is destructive to the emotional health of the child. See id. at 1544. The study revealed that
judicial fact determinations and statutory construction determinations were influenced by
judges’ acceptance of the theory. See id. at 1547-48, 1569-70.
167. Id. at 1548. For a good example of judicial reliance on extraneous, subjective facts
see Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-95 (1992). In Casey,
the Court relied on trial testimony of expert witnesses regarding the broad subject of do-
mestic violence, see id. at 888-90, its own general research on domestic violence, see id. at
890-95, and “common sense,” id. at 892, to hold invalid a Pennsylvania statutory provision
that required the husband’s consent to an abortion. See id. at 895. The Court’s reliance on
that information seems misplaced when the Court admits that the information regarding
the specific issue of “notifying one’s husband about an abortion” is “too small to be repre-
sentative,” id. at 892, and that, in fact, the provision affects fewer than one percent of
women seeking abortions. See id. at 894. It seems the Court, or at least three of the jus-
tices, simply took the opportunity to voice their opinion on domestic violence rather than
address the issue of whether a husband has a right to consent to his wife’s abortion. Com-
pare id. (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, J.J.) (reviewing extraneous material
to arrive at decision), with id. at 972-73 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Thomas, and
White, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (criticizing the joint opinion for concen-
trating on domestic violence situations with no “hard evidence” to support their assump-
tions); see also Scott C. Idleman, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Mak-
ing, 68 IND. L.J. 433 (1993).
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B.   The “Best Interests” Standard
The “best interests standard”168 is a subjective evaluation of the
advantages offered to the child by competing custodial arrange-
ments. In modern case law, this standard has supported the adop-
tive parents in contested adoptions.169 The standard is unconstitu-
tional in contested at-birth adoptions.170 Although an adoption can-
not be finalized unless the biological parents consent or have their
rights terminated, courts applying a best interests standard find
ways to hold that the biological father has “forfeited” his right to con-
test the adoption of his child.171 This judicial practice provides no
                                                                                                                   
168. California’s best interests standard is a good example. In John S. v. Mark K., 898
P.2d 891, 895 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 1272 (1996) the court noted:
If the court finds in such a proceeding that “it is in the best interest of the
child that the father retain his parental rights,” it must enter an order provid-
ing that his consent is necessary for an adoption. In making this determina-
tion, the court “may consider all relevant evidence, including the efforts made
by the father to obtain custody, the age and prior placement of the child, and
the effects of a change of placement on the child.” If, however, the court finds
that it is in the best interest of the child to be adopted by the prospective adop-
tive parents, it must enter an order stating that the father’s consent is not re-
quired. This order also “terminates all [the father’s] parental rights and re-
sponsibilities with respect to the child.”
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Hollinger, supra note 112, at 355
(stating that under the best interests standard, the deciding factor in any adoption or
other adoption-related proceeding is whether the child’s best interests will be served by
granting the adoption).
169. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (“[T]he ‘best
interests of the child’ standard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively encour-
age them to rely on their own personal values.”); Davis, supra note 166, at 1542-43:
In recent years, custody disputes between biological parents (and between
nonparents) have been determined in accordance with the best interests of the
child. Prior to dissemination within legal circles of psychological parent theo-
ries, however, child placement law reflected skepticism within and without the
mental health professions that the best interests of children could be deter-
mined by reliance on rules of thumb drawn from theories of child development.
The law contained no rigid formulae for determining the best interests of chil-
dren, but rather permitted consideration of the broadest variety of factors that
might affect their welfare.
Id.; see also Hollinger, supra note 112, at 355. Hollinger explains that the UAA drafting
committee members agreed that the UAA should have an express rule of construction
stating that the child’s welfare or best interests would be the paramount consideration for
adoption proceedings. See id. Committee members also agreed that the traditional rule
that adoption statutes be strictly construed because they were “in derogation of common
law” was too narrow to achieve the policy promoting the best interests of the child. See id.
However, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
Style Committee refused the provisions because they were too general and susceptible to
ideologically motivated interpretation. See id. at 355-56.
170. See supra Part III.A.
171. See Davis, supra note 166, at 1569-70 (discussing the judiciary’s tendency to in-
terpret statutory language to permit the application of the psychological best interest
standard).
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substantive due process for the biological father and achieves incon-
sistent results.172
In cases following the “best interests standard,” the birth fathers
have assumed some responsibility for their children, but the courts
do not consider their efforts sufficient.173 The courts focus on broad
policy statements within the statutes which state that adoptions are
for the child’s best interests, but the courts more or less ignore spe-
                                                                                                                   
172. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
173. See John S., 898 P.2d at 901; Robert O. v. Russell K., 578 N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992); Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 642 (Utah 1990).
In John S., Mark, the birth father, was 20 and Stephanie, the birth mother, was 15
when she became pregnant. Mark wanted to get married, but Stephanie refused because
she wanted to finish school. See John S., 898 P.2d at 893. They were undecided about
what to do about the pregnancy. See id. However, Mark bought a trailer for them to live in
and went to a yard sale with Stephanie to buy baby apparel. See id. They began attending
birth classes together, enrolled in prenatal nutrition classes, and applied for Medicaid. See
id. at 904 (Kennard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Mark went to medical ap-
pointments with Stephanie and paid to have a sonogram. See id. About four months before
the baby was born, Mark and Stephanie’s relationship began to deteriorate. See id.
Stephanie testified that she began to feel smothered by Mark’s increasing attention to-
ward her. See id. The two argued, Stephanie rushed at Mark with a pen, Mark pushed
Stephanie down on a chair, bruising her arm, and Stephanie had Mark arrested. See id.
At some point, Mark attempted suicide because of the deterioration of his relationship
with Stephanie, but then admitted himself into a rehabilitation hospital. See id. at 893.
When Mark found out that she planned to place the baby for adoption, he contacted vari-
ous politicians, media personalities, legal aid, and private attorneys in an attempt to stop
the adoption plans. See id. at 905. Finally, he drafted his own petition asserting paternity
and seeking custody of the yet unborn child. See id. Nonetheless, the court found that
Mark’s efforts did not demonstrate that he was fully committed to his parental responsi-
bilities, denied his paternity petition, and granted the adoption. See id. at 901.
In Robert O. v. Russell K., 578 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), the couple was en-
gaged but could not agree as to when they should get married. See id. at 595. When Carol
found out she was pregnant, she did not want Robert to believe she had conceived simply
to make him marry her, so she broke off the engagement. See id. Robert moved away, and
Carol began the adoption proceedings. See id. Throughout the proceedings, Carol was not
asked to identify the father of her child, and she never volunteered Robert’s name. See id.
Almost a year after the adoption was finalized, Robert and Carol reconciled and became
engaged again. See id. When Carol finally told Robert about the adoption, he “went nuts”
and immediately took action to get custody of the baby. Id. However, the court refused to
vacate the adoption because Robert had not established a “custodial relationship” with the
baby, although the mother had prevented him from doing so. Id.
In Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990), Steve and Penny were
dating when she became pregnant. See id. at 639. After finding out that Penny was preg-
nant, Steve and his family held a baby shower for her, and Steve contributed to her doc-
tors’ bills. See id. Penny lived with Steve’s mother for some time, and his sister offered to
care for the baby after its birth. See id. When Penny told Steve that she was thinking
about relinquishing the baby for adoption, Steve protested and told her he wanted to raise
the child. See id. When the baby was born, Penny did not tell Steve that she had placed
the child for adoption. See id. at 640 n.2. Instead, she told him she was taking it to Cali-
fornia, and then called Steve’s family from California and told them the baby had died.
See id. The adoption was, nonetheless, upheld. See id. at 644. The Utah Supreme Court
reaffirmed the constitutional validity of its statutory scheme. See id. They did so even
though that scheme allowed termination of parental rights simply because the father did
not file a notice of acknowledgment of paternity, even when he was unaware the baby was
placed for adoption or was told that baby died. See id. at 640.
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cific waiver or termination requirements.174 Courts claim that the
unwed biological father has only an opportunity interest and that
whatever efforts he has taken do not rise to the level of assuming pa-
rental responsibility.175 The contesting fathers lose to the adoptive
parents, and, more disturbingly, the courts ignore the fact that state
action has manufactured the psychological parents, whom the court
now believes can better serve the child’s best interests.176
VI.   FLORIDA’S TREATMENT OF BIOLOGICAL RIGHTS OF UNWED
FATHERS IN ADOPTION PROCEDURES
Historically, Florida has treated biological parents’ rights in
much the same manner as the rest of the nation.177 However, the
current state of the law in Florida, as set forth in In re Adoption of
Baby E.A.W.,178 goes further than any other law or judicial decision
in the nation. Under the E.A.W. decision, an unwed biological father
may have his parental rights severed if he does not form and carry
on a psychological relationship with the pregnant mother, regardless
of whether she wants such a relationship.179
A.   Adoption in Florida
Florida has recognized adoption since at least 1891180 and has had
an adoption statute since 1924.181 Chapter 63, Florida Statutes , was
originally enacted in 1943.182 In 1973, the Legislature revised the
statute to state when an unwed father’s consent to his child’s adop-
tion was required, and when that consent could be waived.183 The
current statute is substantially the same as the 1973 version.184
                                                                                                                   
174. See Davis, supra note 166, at 1569-70; Swayne, 795 P.2d at 642 (stating that it
was not “impossible” for Steve to file acknowledgment simply because Penny had lied to
him).
175. See Swayne, 795 P.2d at 643 (listing all the efforts the father made, but then de-
ciding that because he had not assumed his “legal obligation” of filing the paternity ac-
knowledgment, his due process rights were not violated).
176. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part IV.
178. 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
179. See id. at 963.
180. See Jones v. Harmon, 27 Fla. 238, 242, 9 So. 245, 246 (1891) (granting adoption to
a third party when the natural mother had relinquished the child to the third party and
the maternal aunt contested the adoption proceeding).
181. See State ex rel. Airston v. Bollinger, 88 Fla. 123, 131, 101 So. 282, 285 (1924)
(striking down laws that allowed a parent to part with a child by methods other than the
adoption statute).
182. See Act effective May 18, 1943, ch. 21759, § 1, 1943 Fla. Laws 181 (current ver-
sion at FLA. STAT. § 63.022 (1997)).
183. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1973, ch. 73-159, § 2, 1973 Fla. Laws 312 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 63.022 (Supp. 1972)).
184. Chapter 63 governs the adoption process through state agencies, (see FLA. STAT. §
63.202 (1997)), private agencies, (see id.), and independent agencies, (see id. §§ 63.085-
1998]                         BIOLOGICAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE 419
There are four provisions within chapter 63 that have recently
caused problems for unwed biological fathers due to judicial inter-
pretation: section 63.022, which states the legislative intent for the
chapter; section 63.032(14), which defines abandonment; section
63.062, which tells whose consent is required; and section 63.072,
which defines the waiver of consent.185 After years of appropriately
strictly construing chapter 63,186 Florida courts have recently inter-
preted these provisions as justifying depriving unwed biological fa-
thers of their opportunity interest.
The Florida Legislature intended for chapter 63 to “protect and
promote the well-being of persons being adopted and their birth and
adoptive parents and to provide to all children who can benefit by it
a permanent family life.”187 Chapter 63 also outlines “basic safe-
guards intended to be provided” by the statute.188 These safeguards
include that the child be legally free for adoption,189 and that re-
quired persons consent to the adoption or that the court terminate
the parent-child relationship.190 The section concludes by stating
                                                                                                                   
.092). Generally, the biological mother contacts an agency or intermediary to arrange the
adoption. See E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 964; In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 743 (Fla.
1989); Henriquez v. Adoption Centre, 641 So. 2d 84, 89 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The agency
or intermediary counsels the mother about her decision. See FLA. STAT. § 63.022(1)(k)
(1997). It gathers information from her. See id. § 63.082(3)(a)-(b). After the birth of the
child, the mother consents to the adoption and, thus, to termination of her parental rights.
See id. §§ 63.062(1)(b), 63.082(4). By the time the child is born, prospective adoptive par-
ents have been located and the Department of Children and Family Services has com-
pleted a placement study. See id. § 63.092(2). If the study is favorable, the child can be
placed in the prospective adoptive home. See id. § 63.092(2). If an intermediary is han-
dling the adoption, the intermediary must file a petition for adoption within 30 days of
placement. See id. § 63.102(3). The adoptive parents are petitioners in the proceedings,
while the natural parents are not parties. See id. § 63.112. The petition must include the
required consent or a request for waiver of an unavailable consent. See id. § 63.112(2)(a).
The petitioners are required to exercise good faith and diligent efforts to locate and obtain
required consent, usually the natural father’s, within 60 days after filing the petition. See
id. § 63.062(3). However, cases prove that petitioners are limited by the actions of and in-
formation given by the natural mother to the agency or intermediary. See E.A.W., 658 So.
2d at 964; Doe, 543 So. 2d at 743; Henriquez, 641 So. 2d at 85. Ninety days after place-
ment in the adoptive home, the court simultaneously can hear the adoption petition,
waive consents if necessary, terminate parental rights, and grant the adoption. See FLA.
STAT. §§ 63.082, .085, .092, .112, .122, .142 (1997).
185. See id. §§ 63.022, .032(14), .062, 072.
186. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(Farmer, J., dissenting) (citing In re Miller, 227 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), and
Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), to confirm that adoption statutes are
“in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed.”).
187. FLA. STAT. § 63.022(1) (1997).
188. Id. § 63.022(2).
189. See id. § 63.022(2)(a).
190. See id. § 63.022(2)(b). The safeguards further provide that in adoptions handled
by private intermediaries, the birth parents, adoptive parents, and the child are to receive
the same or similar safeguards, guidance, counseling, and supervision as they would un-
der an agency adoption. See id. § 63.022(2)(k).
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that a court is to enter orders “it deems necessary and suitable to
promote and protect the best interests of the person to be adopted.”191
Effective in 1973, only the consent of the natural mother was re-
quired to legally free a child for adoption.192 Biological fathers had no
right to children born out of wedlock,193 and their consent could be
ignored when a mother simply denied knowing the identity or the lo-
cation of the biological father.194 Currently, a child is not available
for adoption unless there is consent by the biological mother and by
the biological father who has been legally declared the father, filed
acknowledgment, or supported the child.195
A court can waive consent from any parent who has deserted or
abandoned a child, previously had their parental rights terminated,
or been declared incompetent.196 Between 1960 and 1989, chapter 63
did not have a definition of “abandoned.” Instead, courts relied on
the definition in Florida’s dependency statute. According to the
statutory definition of abandonment,197 Florida courts had inter-
                                                                                                                   
191. Id. § 63.022(2)(l).
192. See FLA. STAT. § 63.062 (1973). The relevant portion of the previous section
stated:
No consent is required from the father of a child born out of wedlock when the
mother of the child does not know the identity of the father and a reasonable
search would not reveal his identity. In this event, the mother shall execute an
affidavit under oath that she does not know either the [identity] or location of
the father.
Id.
193. See Clements v. Banks, 159 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (holding that the
putative father had no right to the illegitimate child and that his consent was not re-
quired, although he had provided voluntary support to the child).
194. See id.
195. See FLA. STAT. § 63.062(1) (1997). The statute states:
(1) Unless consent is excused by the court, a petition to adopt a minor may
be granted only if written consent has been executed after the birth of the mi-
nor by:
(a) The mother of the minor.
(b) The father of the minor, if:
1. The minor was conceived or born while the father was married to the
mother.
2. The minor is his child by adoption.
3. The minor has been established by court proceeding to be his child.
4. He has acknowledged in writing, signed in the presence of a competent
witness, that he is the father of the minor and has filed such acknowledgment
with the Office of Vital Statistics of the Department of Health.
5. He has provided the child with support in a repetitive, customary manner.
Id. Also, within 60 days of filing the petition, the adoption petitioners must exercise “good
faith and diligent efforts” to notify and obtain consent from any parent whose consent is
required but who has not consented. Id. § 63.062(3) (outlining the efforts to include con-
ducting interviews and searches of vehicle registrations and correction records, and verify-
ing residential, employment, and Armed Forces service information).
196. See id. § 63.072(1)-(3). The court may also waive consent from a legal guardian or
custodian of the child, other than a parent, who has failed to respond within 60 days to a
request for consent or who is withholding consent unreasonably. See id. § 63.072(4).
197. See id. § 39.01(1). In 1989, when the Doe court began tinkering with the defini-
tion, this section stated:
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preted “abandoned” to mean that a biological parent had totally re-
linquished responsibility for his or her child.198 The courts also re-
quired that the child be born before he could be abandoned.199 In
1989, still relying on the chapter 39 definition,200 the Florida Su-
preme Court redefined “abandoned” in adoption proceedings to in-
clude consideration of a father’s actions constituting less than total
relinquishment and occurring during the prenatal period.201
In In re Adoption of Doe 202 the court acknowledged that a child
must be born before it can be abandoned, but concluded that evi-
dence of a natural father’s prenatal conduct would be relevant to the
issue of abandonment.203 The court based its conclusion on the belief
that “[s]ocietal norms, and chapters 39 and 63 of Florida Statutes,
contemplate that the natural parents will provide for the well-being
of the child.”204 The court then declared, “[w]hen either or both fail to
do so, the best interests of the child, and of society, require that soci-
ety intercede, as in for example, abandonment or adoption proceed-
                                                                                                                   
“Abandoned” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a
child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the person responsible
for the child’s welfare, while being able, makes no provision for the child’s sup-
port and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is
sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations. If the efforts of
such parent or legal custodian, or person primarily responsible for the child’s
welfare to support and communicate with the child are, in the opinion of the
court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all
parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. The failure
by any such person to appear in response to actual or constructive service in a
dependency proceeding shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption of such per-
son’s ability to provide for and communicate with the child.
Id.; see also In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 745 (Fla. 1989).
198. See Doe, 543 So. 2d at 750 (McDonald, J., dissenting) (“Florida has heretofore
properly taken a narrow view as to what constitutes abandonment. Abandonment must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence and must be complete.”) (footnotes omitted).
199. See Wylie v. Botos, 416 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (Anstead, J.) (“We
simply cannot determine with certainty whether the legislature intended to cut off the
rights of a natural father, who, although on notice of his paternity of a child and the pen-
dency of adoption activities, files no acknowledgment of paternity before the legal adop-
tion proceedings are commenced.”).
200. See Doe, 543 So. 2d at 749.
201. See id. at 745-46. The court concluded that “prebirth conduct does tend to prove
or disprove material facts bearing on abandonment and may be properly introduced and
used as a basis for finding abandonment” under chapter 63. Id. at 746.
It is noteworthy that the court’s opinion is practically devoid of citations to previous
state case law but replete with citation to findings made by the United States Congress.
See id. at 741-47 (citing only to In re I.B.J., 497 So. 2d. 1265, 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) re-
garding the revocability of the mother’s consent and disapproving of that decision).
202. 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989).
203. See id. at 745. The court masks the definition of abandonment in the circular rea-
soning that, “[a]ssuming for the moment that prebirth conduct is relevant to material
facts bearing on abandonment, . . . [w]e conclude that prebirth conduct does tend to prove
or disprove material facts bearing on abandonment.” Id. at 745-46.
204. Id. at 746.
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ings.”205 The court found “no constitutional or statutory provisions
that would preclude the state from embracing such a policy,” and
held that a father’s prenatal support is relevant to the determination
of abandonment.206
In 1992, the Legislature revised chapter 63, Florida Statutes , to
include the court’s expanded definition of “abandoned.”207 The defi-
nition tracks the language in section 39.01(1) except for the last sen-
tence stating that “the court may consider the conduct of a father
towards the child’s mother during her pregnancy.”208 Until 1994, that
last sentence was construed to mean that a natural father’s lack of
financial support could be “conduct” considered when determining
whether the father had abandoned the child.209 Then, in E.A.W., the
Florida Supreme Court again expanded the meaning of “conduct” to
allow a court to “consider the lack of emotional support and/or emo-
tional abuse by the father of the mother during her pregnancy.”210
B.   Critique of Chapter 63 in the Context of Contested At-Birth
Adoption Cases
Chapter 63’s provisions should be safeguards for an unwed bio-
logical father who wants to assume responsibility for his child.211
However, a review of the statute as interpreted in two types of con-
tested at-birth adoption cases demonstrates that the current inter-
pretation deprives unwed fathers of their constitutional rights. The
first case occurs when a father has no knowledge that he is a father.
This father lacks knowledge of his fatherhood because the birth
mother has lied about the child’s paternity or her pregnancy alto-
                                                                                                                   
205. Id.; see also id. at 749 (Barkett, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 749.
207. See Act effective July 1, 1992, ch. 92-96, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 852 (adding subsec-
tion 63.032(14), defining “abandoned”). The current chapter 63 definition of “abandoned”
is:
[A] situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child, while being able,
makes no provision for the child’s support and makes no effort to communicate
with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of pa-
rental obligations. If, in the opinion of the court, the efforts of such parent or
legal custodian to support and communicate with the child are only marginal
efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the
court may declare the child to be abandoned. In making this decision, the court
may consider the conduct of a father towards the child’s mother during her
pregnancy.
FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (1997).
208. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 966 (Fla. 1995) (emphasis added).
209. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 937-38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(Farmer, J., dissenting)).
210. E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 965.
211. See FLA. STAT. § 63.022(2)(a) (1997) (stating that child must be legally free to be
adopted); E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966 (“[The] best interests evidence was not relevant unless
Baby E.A.W. was available for adoption and that she was not available for adoption with-
out a finding that she had been abandoned.”).
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gether.212 As a result of his lack of knowledge, the father does not as-
sume any prenatal or postnatal responsibility for his child.213 How-
ever, as soon as he does know he has fathered the child, he asserts
his legal rights.214 In these cases, section 63.062 would unconstitu-
tionally deny fathers standing to contest an adoption.215 Biological
fathers have a fundamental right to an opportunity to establish a
relationship with their children. If the father is denied standing to
contest the adoption because, through no fault of his own, he did not
know he was a father, his due process rights are violated. The father
cannot exercise his constitutional right to establish a relationship
with his child if he has no opportunity to do so.216
The second type of case is where the father knows about the
pregnancy and takes some responsibility for the impending child
during the pregnancy. This father, like Gary Bjorklund, is deprived
of his opportunity interest by the court’s determination that, al-
though he took some measures to assume parenthood, he had not
taken the appropriate measures. In these cases the unwed father
has been deprived of his substantive due process rights.
Section 63.072’s definition of “abandoned” is the catch-all to allow
courts to waive the father’s consent to the adoption. The new,
broader definition of “abandoned” affords biological fathers little or
no substantive protection for their opportunity to establish a paren-
tal relationship.217 It raises a significant issue about waiving a natu-
ral father’s consent to an adoption.218 Specifically, upon what evi-
dence should a court rely when determining whether a putative fa-
ther has assumed enough responsibility for a child that is not yet
                                                                                                                   
212. See, e.g., In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 240-41 (Iowa 1992) (noting that the
mother lied about the paternity of the child); Robert O. v. Russell K., 578 N.Y.S.2d 594,
595 (N.Y. 1992) (stating that the mother broke off the engagement and the relationship
with the father after she found out that she was pregnant and never told the father of the
pregnancy).
213. See B.G.C., 469 N.W.2d at 241; Robert O., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
214. See B.G.C., 469 N.W.2d at 241; Robert O., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
215. See O’Bryan v. Doe, 572 So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (reversing the trial
court’s finding that the biological father’s consent was not required, even though the child
was born while the mother was married to another man, because the father had bought
baby supplies for the child, signed an apartment lease and lived with the mother during
her pregnancy, and had his name entered on the birth certificate); In re Adoption of Mul-
lenix, 359 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (holding that the father’s consent was not re-
quired when the pregnant mother had left the state and he had no opportunity to provide
support for her); Department of HRS v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d 865, 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
(affirming the trial court’s order denying the department’s motion to “ferret out” the natu-
ral father).
216. See E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 965.
217. See id. at 981 (Anstead, J., dissenting); In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 751
(Fla. 1989).
218. See E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 961; Doe, 543 So. 2d at 741.
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born? Such evidentiary standards should be objective and legisla-
tively mandated to ensure consistency among the judicial districts.219
VII.   RECOMMENDING THE BIOLOGICAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Despite some consideration of biological fathers’ rights, our courts
have yet to decide the crucial issue presented in newborn adoptions:
what constitutional protection should be afforded to an unwed bio-
logical father when, through no fault of his own, he has had little to
no opportunity to take responsibility for his newborn child. Past Su-
preme Court cases involving unwed biological fathers are distin-
guishable from the more recent state cases across the nation. These
distinguishing characteristics demonstrate that previous decisions
are helpful but leave many unresolved issues for states to address.
The central issues are whether a presumption should be given to the
unwed father based on his biological connection with his child and
his nonconsent to the adoption, and whether that presumption
should preclude claims by third parties.
Because adoptions are statutorily created and controlled, the
Legislature can provide adequate procedures that protect the inter-
ests of unwed fathers. The Legislature should expressly state that
chapter 63 is to be strictly construed to protect foremost the rights of
biological parents. This pronouncement would require courts to ad-
here to the statutory provisions regarding notice, consent require-
ments, and waiver provisions. However, to aid the courts, the Legis-
lature should ensure that new language is specific enough to prevent
judicial deviation when determining whether an unwed father has
assumed his parental responsibilities.
Under chapter 63, determining who receives notice of the adop-
tion depends on who is required to consent to the adoption.220 There-
fore, the classification of fathers whose consent is required should be
as broad as the classification for mothers.221 Simply put, consent
should be required from all biological fathers,222 and the prospective
father in every case should be served with notice of the proceeding.
The biological father must know that he is a father and that the
birth mother expects to place the child for adoption. This requires
                                                                                                                   
219. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(Farmer, J., dissenting) (“When something affecting a constitutionally protected right
must be proved with clear and convincing evidence, I do not believe it is possible to carry
the day with facts that are susceptible to differing inferences, one probative and the other
not.”).
220. See FLA. STAT. § 63.062(1)(b) (1997).
221. See id. § 63.062(1)(a).
222. Cf. id. § 63.062(1)(b)(1)-(4).
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notice to him by the mother during the pregnancy, and by an inter-
mediary at the initiation of adoption proceedings.223
Initially, the biological mother should be required to identify and
serve notice on the biological father (or them if there is more than
one prospective biological father) of her intent to place the child for
adoption.224 Once the father has been served with notice, he should
have a certain amount of time to assert his intent not to consent to
the adoption and to seek custody of the child. If he comes forward,
the court should presume that he is fit to take custody of the child,
order him to pay a portion of the prenatal and birth expenses, and
grant him custody upon the child’s birth.225
This provision would address the fathers in both types of at-birth
adoption scenarios but would most protect those who have been de-
ceived by the mother. Currently, the prospective adoptive parents
are responsible for noticing the birth father if his consent has not
been obtained, and there are diligent search requirements in the
statute.226 However, if the birth mother lies about the identity of the
father, those procedures are useless. Requiring that she be the for-
mal party to notice the biological father is appropriate because she is
the only party with the intimate knowledge that she is pregnant and
of the probable date of conception.
Next, the Legislature should devise a specific set of circumstances
under which a father’s consent can be waived.227 The waiver provi-
sions should provide substantive protection for biological fathers. If
the father refuses to consent, the biological rights doctrine would
prevent the court from waiving his consent unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that he is unfit. A claim that the father is unfit
may arise at two points in the proceedings—before the child’s birth
and after the child’s birth. If the father asserts his rights during the
prenatal period, the biological mother would have the burden of re-
                                                                                                                   
223. In some cases this is by an intermediary’s request for consent to the father rather
than the mother notifying him.
224. See E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 931 (Pariente, J., concurring) (suggesting that legisla-
tion could require the mother to notice the father of her intent to place the child for adop-
tion). Because the goal is to be reasonably certain that the father did receive notice, actual
service should be required and constructive notice used only when the revised diligent
search inquiry has failed to locate the father. The intermediary could represent the birth
mother in this portion of the proceeding, and these costs could be part of the allowable ex-
penses for the adoption. The court will determine who is the true biological father through
the mother’s testimony or paternity testing.
225. If, after the father asserts his interest, the mother also asserts her interest in
keeping the child rather than placing the child for adoption, the statute could refer the
court to the custody and support provisions in chapter 61, Florida Statutes, and the case
would proceed as a paternity suit. See FLA. STAT. §§ 61.13, .30, 742.011-.17 (1997).
226. See id. § 63.0620.
227. For example, the definition of “abandoned” could be deleted from section 63.032
and references to it deleted from section 63.072(1). See supra notes 202-10 and accompa-
nying text.
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butting the father’s presumption of fitness. Requiring the mother to
be a party to the fitness hearing would be an extension of her desire
to do what is best for her child and of her duty to notify the father of
his paternity. If the father asserts his interest after the child’s birth,
the prospective adoptive parents would have the burden of proving
his unfitness. In either case, only clear and convincing evidence of
the failure to attempt to provide financial support in accordance with
his means should be evidence of unfitness.
Another waiver circumstance would address the unlocated father.
If the mother claims that the biological father cannot be identified,
located, or served, the court should conduct a strict inquiry as to the
diligent search efforts of the mother.228 If the court is reasonably
satisfied that the father cannot be identified, located, or served, then
it can waive the requirement for the father’s consent. However, this
scenario poses the problem of when the biological father’s rights
should be superseded by the best interests of the child. To answer
this dilemma, the statute should contain a “window of opportunity,”
to begin after the biological father gains knowledge of the pregnancy
or subsequent adoption, in which he can assume parental responsi-
bility and contest the adoption.229 If the father appears during ongo-
ing proceedings, he should have standing to contest the adoption and
assume custody of the child. If he does not gain knowledge of the
adoption until after it is finalized, the current one-year limitation to
attack adoption orders would prevail, unless he can defend his inac-
tion by a lack of knowledge.
VIII.   CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Over the past few years, several legislative proposals have at-
tempted to address the various issues surrounding contested adop-
tions. In Florida alone, at least ten bills have been introduced since
1994 to revise chapter 63.230 The number of issues that arise in
adoption proceedings and the diversity of opinion about how to ad-
dress those issues may explain why these bills have failed. Nonethe-
                                                                                                                   
228. The diligent search requirement should include an inquiry into the mother’s
prebirth living and support circumstances, see id. § 63.072(3), and should exhaust avenues
of identifying a biological father whom the mother refused to, or could not, identify. Cf.
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, § 3-401 (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 46-47 (Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. §
39.4051, (1997) (dependency proceedings); id. § 39.4625 (termination of parental rights
proceedings); Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996). The Legislature could ensure the
integrity of these search efforts by allowing a civil penalty against any woman who misin-
formed the court regarding the birth father. Cf. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-404, 9 U.L.A. at
49.
229. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 63.182 (1997) (allowing one year to appeal a final order of adop-
tion).
230. See, e.g., Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997); Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. SB
178 (1996); Fla. HB 1837 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996); Fla. HB 65 (1996); Fla. SB 2378
(1994); Fla. HB 2819 (1994); Fla. HB 2491 (1994).
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less, legislators must continue working toward a consensus and
eventually resolve these difficult issues. An evaluation of the various
provisions to revise legislative intent, consent, and waiver of consent
in recent bills231 and other legislative proposals in the context of the
two types of at-birth adoption cases, focuses the debate.
A.   Proposals That Are Too Far Off
1.   The Uniform Adoption Act
In 1994, the Revised Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) was proposed
to the states.232 In 1995, it was introduced in the Florida Legislature
as House Bill 65, but did not proceed past that introduction.233 The
UAA does not address legislative intent;234 any interpretation of the
intent behind the statute would be discerned from extraneous mate-
rial, such as the prefatory material and comments.235 The UAA’s
section 109 subparts are intended to support the best interests of the
child, and to grant to the trial court broad discretion when determin-
ing adoption matters.236
                                                                                                                   
231. This discussion concerns bills that sought to significantly alter chapter 63; it is
not exhaustive of all attempts at revision. For example, other bills provided for the ad-
ministration of “Andrew” rights to the birth mother. See Fla. SB 178 (1996); Fla. SB 2322
(1995). Essentially, “Andrew” rights are a listing of rights given to mothers in the state of
Florida who may choose to give their child up for adoption. See Fla. SB 178 (1996); Fla. SB
2322 (1995). Other bills sought to add that a prospective adoptee may be removed from an
unsuitable adoptive home prior to adoption finalization. See Fla. SB 752 (1995); Fla. HB
349 (1995).
232. In 1996, Vermont became the first state to enact the UAA. See P.A. 161, § 136,
Laws of Vermont (1996) (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A (1996)).
233. See Fla. HB 65 (1995). This bill incorporated the UAA without modification;
therefore, this analysis of the UAA is applicable also to House Bill 65.
234. See Hollinger, supra note 112, at 355-56 (explaining that the NCCUSL committee
would not allow an intent section because the best interests standard was too subjective
and did not fit within the parameters of objective law guidelines suited for uniform provi-
sions).
235. See Fla. HB 65 (1995). The prefatory note states:
The guiding principle of the Uniform Adoption Act is a desire to promote the
welfare of children, and particularly to facilitate the placement of minor chil-
dren whose biological parents cannot raise them, by permanently placing them
in stable homes with adoptive parents who are willing to assume all parental
rights and responsibilities for them. This chapter is premised on the belief that
adoption offers significant legal, economic, social and psychological benefits,
not only for children who might otherwise be without a family, but also for
parents who are unable to care for their children, prospective parents who
want children to nurture and support, and the state government that is ulti-
mately responsible for the well-being of children.
Id.; see UNIF. ADOPTION ACT Prefatory Note (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1997); see
also Fla. SB 2378 (1994); Fla. HB 2819 (1994). Both used the prefatory material as legis-
lative intent.
236. See Hollinger, supra note 112, at 357 (“[T]he UAA is replete with specific provi-
sions, including the ultimate judicial decision to grant or deny an adoption, in which the
determinative factor is best interests, avoidance of detriment, or promotion of the child’s
welfare.”).
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Determining who receives notice of the adoption depends on who
must consent to the proceeding. The UAA categorizes certain fathers
who have “functioned” as parents and requires that they receive no-
tice.237 If the mother claims not to know who is the biological father
of her child, the UAA requires the court to inquire into attempts to
identify the father.238
Once identified, the UAA requires the consent of several catego-
ries of biological fathers who have “functioned” as their children’s
parents. An unwed and unestablished biological father must consent
to the adoption when he has acknowledged239 his paternity and pro-
vided financial support for, visited, and communicated with the
child,240 or received the child into his home and held out the minor as
his child.241 Fathers falling into either of these categories are pre-
sumed fit and cannot have their parental rights involuntarily termi-
nated except on proof of specified grounds by clear and convincing
evidence.242 The UAA contemplates termination of a biological fa-
ther’s rights only when his conduct manifests “serious failures to
perform parental responsibilities” and the evidence is sufficient to
overcome the presumption of fitness.243
                                                                                                                   
237. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 1-101(10), 9 U.L.A. at 6. “Parent” is expressly defined
in the Act to be “an individual who is legally recognized as a mother or father or whose
consent to the adoption of a minor is required.” Id. Any man named by the mother as the
child’s father must also receive notice of the adoption proceedings. See id. § 3-401(a)(3), 9
U.L.A. at 46.
238. See id. § 3-404(a), 9 U.L.A. at 48. The Act also provides that if the mother inten-
tionally misidentifies the father, she is subject to a civil fine of not more than $5000. See
id. § 7-105(f), 9 U.L.A. at 88. Vermont modified section seven of the UAA to avoid any di-
rect implication of a devious mother; instead, Vermont’s statute has one general enforce-
ment provision that allows a penalty for any violation of the provisions of the Act rather
than a specific section addressing the mother. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-101 (1996).
239. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401(a)(1)(iii), 9 U.L.A. at 27 (noting that a father ac-
knowledges this paternity by signing “a document which has the effect of establishing his
parentage of the minor”).
240. See id. §§ 2-401(a)(1)(iii)(A), 3-504, 9 U.L.A. at 27, 53-54. The Act provides that if
a child is under six months of age, the father must pay reasonable prenatal, natal, and
postnatal expenses, and support payments according to his financial means, visit the
child, and manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the
child. See id. § 3-504, 9 U.L.A. at 53-54. If the child is over six months old, the father must
provide financial support according to his means for the six months prior to filing of the
termination petition, communicate regularly with the child, and manifest an ability to as-
sume custody of the child. See id.
241. See id. § 2-401(a)(1)(iv), 9 U.L.A. at 27.
242. See id. § 3-504(c) & cmt, 9 U.L.A. at 53-55. The UAA enumerates the various
ways in which an unwed father’s rights may be terminated and expressly establishes the
burden of proof for termination under the specific grounds. See id. § 3-504, 9 U.L.A. at 53-
54. If the father fails to respond to the notice, his parental rights can be terminated by the
court. If the father responds and asserts his parental rights, the court can terminate his
rights if he has failed to provide financial support during the prenatal, natal, and postna-
tal periods. See id. § 3-504(c)(1)(i), 9 U.L.A. at 53.
243. Id. § 3-504 & cmt, 9 U.L.A. at 53-55. See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
745 (1982) (establishing that grounds for termination of parental rights must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence).
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The UAA encourages social engineering by utilizing the best in-
terests of the child standard. Under the UAA, judges are encouraged
to subjectively evaluate which custodial arrangement is better suited
to the child’s welfare and may ignore the biological parent’s rights if
denying the adoption would be detrimental to the child’s best inter-
ests.244 Termination proceedings may not be fair because they do not
provide substantive protection for the biological father who, through
no fault of his own, was prevented from assuming his parental re-
sponsibilities.245 Under the termination provisions,246 the thwarted
father can defend his inaction by proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he had a compelling reason for not providing financial
support or visiting with the child.247 For fathers like Gary Bjorklund,
however, that defense is negated by judicial consideration of the fa-
ther’s behavior during the mother’s pregnancy, particularly where
the mother has rejected his offers of support.248
Further, the Act appears to be difficult to administer and may
achieve inconsistent results. Although the UAA requires expeditious
handling of all adoption proceedings, the number of possible eviden-
tiary hearings available under the UAA could delay finality of an
adoption decision. Theoretically, a court could determine in one
                                                                                                                   
244. See Hollinger, supra note 112, at 359, 361. While Hollinger claims that the UAA
is “front-loaded with due process protections,” she misses the point that even with those
protections there is no substantive due process when a judge can decide a biological par-
ent’s rights based on his subjective determination of the child’s best interest.
245. See Lowe, supra note 89, at 400 (“[T]he grounds for the termination of parental
rights under the Act are considerably broader than those available under most states’
child protection laws [and] the Act seeks to redress the imbalance inherent in the parental
rights doctrine.”).
246. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-504(c)(3), 9 U.L.A. at 53. Section 3-504(d) gives sev-
eral reasons for termination. Those reasons include the circumstances of the minor’s con-
ception, the parent’s behavior during the pregnancy or since birth or toward another mi-
nor, detriment to the minor, the parent’s efforts to assume physical and legal custody, the
quality of the parent/child relationship, the suitability of the child’s present custodial en-
vironment, and the effect of a custody change on the minor. See id., 9 U.L.A. at 53-54.
247. See id.
248. See id. § 3-504(e)(4)(c), 9 U.L.A. at 54. The Commission relied in part on In re
Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989), to say that it is constitutional to consider the
prebirth conduct of a father. See id. The commission also relied on In re Baby Girl K., 335
N.W.2d 846 (Wis. 1983), and Doe v. Attorney W., 210 So. 2d 1312 (Miss. 1982), to come to
this conclusion. However, those cases are distinguishable because they involved fathers
who knew about the pregnancies and births but took no action to assert their interest
until well after the adoption was begun or finalized.
Likewise, the Commission did not express any intent that courts should consider the fa-
ther’s emotional support of the mother during the prebirth period. In fact, the UAA’s pro-
visions are so laden with requirements for the father to assume financial responsibility
and maintain a relationship with the child that they may preclude consideration of emo-
tional support. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401(a), 9 U.L.A. at 27 (requiring consent
from a father who has financially supported the child or established a relationship with
the child); id. § 3-504(c)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) 9 U.L.A. at 53 (allowing termination of parental
rights if the father has not provided financial support or attempted to establish a relation-
ship with his child who is less than six months old).
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hearing whether the father could be identified, whether his consent
was necessary, whether his rights should be terminated, and
whether the custodial arrangement would serve the child’s best in-
terests. But recent cases prove that one hearing to determine all
those issues is impractical and highly unlikely. Therefore, the adop-
tion process and challenges to it could be drawn out.249
2.   Best Interests Bills
Over the past few years, several best interests bills have been in-
troduced in the Florida Legislature.250 The most recent best interests
bills, Senate Bill 1762 and House Bill 1257 (1997 bills), were intro-
duced in 1997 and were companion bills with the same text and re-
visions.251 Under these 1997 bills, the state’s chief concern was the
best interests of the child;252 that intent was clarified in a definition
of the “best interest of the person to be adopted.”253 The definition
listed the factors to be considered when determining what is in the
best interests of the child, which were taken from Florida’s depend-
ency statute.254
                                                                                                                   
249. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 973 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that the UAA relied on In re Adoption of
Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989), as authority). Justice Kogan questioned the constitu-
tionality of the Doe decision because it cuts off the birth father’s opportunity interest
based on his relationship with the birth mother and not the child. See id. at 972, 975.
250. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997); Fla. SB 1876 (1996); Fla. HB 1837
(1996); Fla. SB 752 (1995); Fla. HB 349 (1995); Fla. SB 264 (1994).
251. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997).
252. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997). The 1997 bills were somewhat wa-
tered down when compared to past best interests bills. E.g., compare Fla. SB 1876 (1996)
and Fla. HB 1837 (1996), with Fla. SB 752 (1995) and Fla. HB 349 (1995).
253. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997). That definition states:
“Best interest of the person to be adopted” means that the adoption will protect
and promote the health, safety, physical, and psychological well-being of the
prospective adoptee. This consideration shall not include a comparison be-
tween the attributes of the parents and those of any persons providing a pres-
ent or potential placement for the child. For the purpose of determining the
manifest best interests of the child, the court shall consider and evaluate all
relevant factors.
Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997).
254. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997). Those considerations are:
(5)(a) The ability and disposition of the parent or parents to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial care recognized and per-
mitted under state law instead of medical care and other material needs of the
child.
(b) The capacity of the parent or parents to care for the child to the extent
that the child’s health and well-being will not be endangered upon the child’s
return home.
(c) The present mental and physical health needs of the child and such fu-
ture needs of the child to the extent that such future needs can be ascertained
based on the present condition of the child.
(d) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the child
and the child’s parent or parents, siblings, and other relatives, and the degree
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The 1997 bills included various notice provisions. First, under the
consent provision, the bills retained the current diligent search re-
quirement.255 However, the petitioners’ diligent search time was re-
duced to thirty days.256 The 1997 bills also proposed a new notice
section to cover fathers who cannot be identified or located through
diligent search efforts.257 Finally, any “prospective male parent is
deemed to have notice at the time of sexual intercourse and a lack of
knowledge shall not be a defense to contesting the adoption of a child
conceived.”258
                                                                                                                   
of harm to the child that would arise from the termination of parental rights
and duties.
(e) The child’s ability to form a significant relationship with a parental sub-
stitute and the likelihood that the child will enter into a more stable and per-
manent family relationship as a result of permanent termination of parental
rights and duties.
(f) The length of time that the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory envi-
ronment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(g) The depth of the relationship existing between the child and the present
custodian.
(h) The reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to ex-
press a preference.
(i) The recommendations for the child provided by the child’s guardian, at-
torney ad litem, or legal representative.
Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997). Cf. FLA. STAT. § 39.4612 (1997).
255. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997).
256. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997). Currently, the diligent search re-
quirement is 60 days. See FLA. STAT. § 63.062(3) (1997).
257. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997). Relevant portions of proposed sec-
tion 63.063, Florida Statutes , read:
63.063 Notice of adoption.—
(1) Any person whose consent to the adoption is required by this chapter who
has not consented.
(2) The mother of the minor, unless her parental rights have been termi-
nated or she has executed a voluntary consent which contains a written waiver
of notice of the adoption proceedings.
(3) Any man, who:
(a) Is or has been married to the mother of the minor and the child was con-
ceived or born during the marriage or born during the marriage and he is the
biological father of the child or has filed a paternity action pursuant to section
742.091;
(b) Adopted the minor;
(c) Has been established by court proceeding to be the father of the child; or
(d) Has provided the minor and the minor’s mother during pregnancy with
support in a repetitive, customary manner taking into consideration the needs
of the mother.
(4) Any party who is attempting to revoke consent on the ground that it was
obtained by fraud or duress.
(5) Any individual who claims to be or is named as the father or possible fa-
ther of the adoptee or a person who the birth mother has reason to believe may
be the father of the child.
Id.
258. Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997); see also Fla. SB 1876 (1996); Fla. HB
1837 (1996); Fla. SB 752 (1995); Fla. HB 349 (1995). Previous bills have also proposed this
notice section. Senate Bill 752 and House Bill 349 (companion bills) placed this statement
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The 1997 bills required consent from both the father who is mar-
ried to the mother and the unwed biological father, if they have both
filed a paternity action and responded to the notice of the adop-
tion.259 The bills also contained provisions that allow the court to
waive consent from fathers who have abandoned the child,260 have
not filed a paternity action or provided the mother with financial and
emotional support, or are found unfit to take custody of the child.261
Additionally, the 1997 bills created a new (and questionable)
“implied consent” provision.262 Consent could be implied if a birth fa-
ther failed to provide support, failed to respond to the notice of
adoption, or failed to file a paternity suit.263
The premises of the best interests bills are unconstitutional. Al-
though the 1997 bills provided adequate notice and consent proce-
dures, there was no substantive protection for fathers in either of the
two types of cases. Under the waiver of consent provision, the court
can waive consent from a parent if the court finds that parent unfit,
but the bills offered no explanation of “unfit.” In time, the waiver of
consent provision could have become even more encompassing than
the current catch-all, “abandoned.” The 1997 bills offered no defini-
tion or elements that would have guided the courts when deciding
whether a parent is unfit, leaving the judiciary in the same subjec-
tive position they are in now. Aside from determining whether a
biological father has provided the mother with enough financial and
emotional support, the court could simply find the father unfit. This
procedure is inadequate to protect the unwed biological father’s op-
portunity to establish a relationship with his child. An unguided fit-
ness determination is not a necessary means to accomplish the
state’s interest in protecting the welfare of children or parental
rights to parent one’s own children.
                                                                                                                   
in the legislative intent section: “It is the further intent of the Legislature that a man is
on notice that a child may have been conceived when he has sexual intercourse, whether
or not contraception was used.” Fla. SB 752 (1995); Fla. HB 349 (1995). Under either pro-
posal, this point of demarcation—at the time of intercourse—is much too early. A man
should not be on notice that he may be a father, much less that any gamete will possibly
become a zygote which will become a child who will be placed for adoption, unless he has
some indication that a woman is pregnant. These notice-of-adoption-at-time-of-sex pro-
posals are unjust because, theoretically, they mean that a man must file a paternity suit
or start financially and emotionally supporting the mother in a customary and repetitive
manner the day after he has sex with her because he has notice that she will place his
prospective child for adoption.
259. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997).
260. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997). The bills kept the current defini-
tion of “abandoned” but added to it that incarceration of a parent will not preclude a find-
ing of abandonment. See id.
261. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997).
262. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997).
263. See Fla. SB 1762 (1997); Fla. HB 1257 (1997). This provision is questionable be-
cause it assumes the father had notice and that his inaction was his own decision.
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B.   Proposals That Are Close, But Not Good Enough
1.   1996 Florida Bills
Senate Bill 3026 and House Bill 227, both introduced in 1996,
proposed a completely different system based on two very question-
able principles. First, the 1996 bills revised legislative intent to state
that “termination of parental rights other than by consent or waiver
shall be governed by chapter 39.”264 Then, they created a new section
to outline diligent search requirements265 and required that notice of
the adoption be served on the mother, any one whose consent is re-
quired but has not consented, and any man who has filed an action
to establish paternity in the particular paternity action at issue.266
                                                                                                                   
264. Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996). The revised section 63.022(2)(l), Florida
Statutes, reads:
In all matters coming before the court pursuant to this act, the court shall en-
ter such orders as it deems necessary and suitable to promote and protect the
best interests of the person to be adopted.
Id.
265. See Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996). The new section was:
63.063  Due Diligence; consent and notification; cooperation.—
(1) The petitioner must make good faith and diligent efforts to identify, lo-
cate, notify, and obtain written consent from the persons required to consent to
adoption within 60 days after filing the petition. These efforts shall include
conducting interviews and record searches to locate those persons, including
verifying information related to location of residence, employment, service in
the Armed Forces, vehicle registration in this state, and corrections records.
(2) In attempting to identify and locate the father, inquiry shall be made as
to whether:
(a) The woman who gave birth to the minor adoptee was married at the
probable time of conception of the minor, or at a later time.
(b) The woman was cohabiting with a man at the probable time of conception
of the minor.
(c) The woman has received payments or promises of support, other than
from a governmental agency, with respect to the minor or because of her preg-
nancy.
(d) The woman has named any individual as the father on the birth certifi-
cate of the minor or in connection with applying for or receiving public assis-
tance.
(e) Any individual has formally or informally acknowledged or claimed pa-
ternity of the minor in a jurisdiction in which the woman resided during or
since her pregnancy, or in which the minor resided or resides, at the time of
the inquiry.
Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996).
266. See Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996). The proposed new section 63.117,
Florida Statutes , was:
63.117  Notice of adoption petition.—
Notice of the adoption proceeding, along with a copy of the petition, must be
served by the petitioner on:
(1) Any person whose consent is required, who has not consented.
(2) The mother of the minor, unless her parental rights have been termi-
nated.
(3) Any man who has filed an action to establish paternity.
(4) Any person who is seeking to revoke a consent.
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The 1996 bills also deleted the definition of “abandoned” and greatly
revised the consent requirements.267 Under these proposals, consent
was required only from the fathers who filed an acknowledgment of
paternity.268 The court could waive consent from a father who was
not married to the mother, or who received actual notice prior to
birth that he is or may be the father of the child and “thereafter, fails
to pay any of the living, medical, parental, or birth expenses of the
mother or fails to take any action to assert his parental rights prior
to the birth or within 60 days after the birth of the child.”269 Finally,
the 1996 bills attempted to clarify termination procedures by propos-
ing separate proceedings for termination of parental rights.270
Though they did clarify notice and termination proceedings, the
1996 bills failed to adequately protect the rights of several types of
unwed fathers. Specifically, the bills based an unwed father’s paren-
tal rights on whether he legally assumed his parental responsibili-
ties, and then based termination of those parental rights on whether
his relationship with his child is detrimental to the child. The pro-
posed use of chapter 39 termination proceedings was misplaced.271
Use of chapter 39 would begin the termination inquiry from the per-
spective that there has been a parental relationship and that the
relationship has been detrimental to the child.272 This perspective is
                                                                                                                   
Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996). The bills also created a new section requiring
notice of the adoption hearing. See Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996). Those pro-
posed changes tracked the notice requirements in the proposed section 63.117 but added
the requirement that any man who has filed an action to establish paternity must receive
notice of the adoption hearing. See Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996) (proposed §
63.122(e)).
267. See Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996).
268. See Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996).
269. Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996).
270. See Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996). That proposal stated:
63.124  Separate proceeding for termination of parental rights.—
(1) Any proceeding to terminate parental rights of either birth parent must
be filed pursuant to and in accordance with chapter 39, and must be filed sepa-
rately from the petition for adoption. The final hearing on any such proceeding
to terminate parental rights must occur prior to the final hearing on the adop-
tion petition.
Fla. SB 3026 (1996); Fla. HB 227 (1996).
271. See FLA. STAT. § 39.462 (1997). Chapter 39 provides further notice requirements
and diligent search efforts before terminating parental rights. See id. § 39.462 (requiring
notice of termination proceedings); id. § 39.4625 (requiring a diligent search when the
parent subject to termination proceedings is unidentified and unlocated).
272. Assuming that the termination petition would have to state grounds for termina-
tion under section 39.464, subsection (c) would be a likely ground for termination in pur-
suit of adoption. See id. § 39.464(1)(c). This ground for termination is:
When the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward
other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the par-
ent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life or well-being
of the child irrespective of the provision of services. Provision of services is
evidenced by proof that services were provided through a previous plan or of-
fered as a case plan from a child welfare agency.
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wrong because in the unwed father cases the child is placed at-birth
and the father has been unable to develop any relationship with his
child, let alone a detrimental relationship. In unwed father cases,
the focus of the inquiry should be on whether the unwed father has
given some indicia of his intent to assume his parental responsibili-
ties. The use of chapter 39 is not an appropriate means for determin-
ing the unwed father’s intentions toward his newborn child.
Additionally, the 1996 bills were underinclusive. Only fathers
who had filed acknowledgments of paternity were required to con-
sent to the adoption. This means that fathers who were unaware of
the filing system but had supported the mother or were willing to as-
sume custody of the child would not have had standing to contest the
adoptions. However, even when a father does file an acknowledg-
ment, there is no guarantee that his rights will not be terminated.273
Usually, an unwed father only knows about the acknowledgment
system because he has consulted an attorney. Then, when he ap-
pears in court, the current animosity toward fathers who “rush to
the Legal Aid Society . . . in an effort to get a free lawyer to start
fighting for some supposed legal right”274 works against them. A fa-
ther who takes actual responsibility for his child should not be pre-
cluded from contesting an adoption simply because he did not file an
acknowledgment. The exclusion of some unwed fathers because they
did not file an acknowledgment, although they may have fully as-
sumed other responsibilities, is not a necessary means to accomplish
the state’s goal of protecting the welfare of children.
                                                                                                                   
Id. That subsection’s use of the term “conduct” would invite analogy to interpretation of
chapter 63’s definition of abandoned. Such an analogy would interpret chapter 39’s termi-
nology to mean that evidence of the father’s lack of prenatal financial and emotional sup-
port of the natural mother would be conduct demonstrative of the detriment to the child’s
well-being.
273. See Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 643 (Utah 1990). In Swayne, the
unwed biological father did not want to marry the mother, knew she was pregnant, and
made living arrangements for her. See id. at 639. When the mother told him she was con-
sidering placing the child for adoption, he told her that he wanted the child. See id. None-
theless, before the birth of the child, the mother covertly planned to place the child for
adoption, and upon the child’s birth, she relinquished the child to social services. See id.
Instead of telling the father about the placement, she lied to him and said that the baby
had died. See id., at 639 n.2. The mother soon told the father about her deception and the
next day the father filed the acknowledgment. See id. at 640. Within three months, he had
also filed a paternity suit and both he and the mother had filed notices to contest the
adoption. See id. The Utah Supreme Court held that its acknowledgment statute did not
violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses and denied the father standing to
contest the adoption. See id.
274. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
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2.   Statute Clarifying the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Newborn
Adoptions
Recently, another suggestion for legislative reform has also sup-
ported a “filed-fathers only” system.275 The Statute Clarifying the
Rights of Unwed Fathers in Newborn Adoptions (SCRUFNA) states
that it intends to balance the interests involved in the adoption proc-
ess while providing “clear, objective guidelines” for adjudication of
these cases and restoring efficiency and permanence to the adoption
system.276 To preserve his parental interest, the unwed father must
register with a putative father registry.277 SCRUFNA suggests
making the filing of paternity notice more simplified by establishing
a nationwide telephone or mail registration system.278 Filing with
the registry “vests” the father with a rebuttable presumption of pa-
rental rights that entitles him to custody of the child.279 However, if a
prospective unwed biological father fails to register within thirty
days after the birth of the child or before the day the child is surren-
dered for adoption, whichever is later, a court can find that he has
abandoned the child and forfeited his parental rights.280 The adop-
tive parents can then attempt to overcome the presumption by
proving a ground for termination of the natural father’s parental
rights.281 SCRUFNA proposes that such grounds would include
“incompetence, physical abuse of the mother during her pregnancy,
conviction for a violent felony within the last ten years, and spurning
a birth mother’s pleas for assistance during pregnancy.”282
This proposal has two serious flaws. First, the biological father
has the initial burden of discovering the pregnancy and the subse-
quent surrender of the child for adoption.283 Considering the over-
whelming autonomy a pregnant mother has, a biological father
should not carry that burden. Only the mother has the choice of
aborting the child or placing the child for adoption. It is overburden-
some to require “men who are concerned that they may have im-
pregnated a woman and are interested in taking responsibility for
their potential offspring, to take . . . affirmative action” by filing.284
An unwed father has a fundamental right to establish a relationship
with his child. Requiring the father to register every time there is a
                                                                                                                   
275. See Resnik, supra note 113, at 422.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 424.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 423.
281. See id.
282. Id. at 426.
283. See id.
284. Id. at 424.
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chance that he may be a father when he has no knowledge that a
woman is even pregnant, much less that he may be the father, is not
a necessary means to achieve the state’s interests.
Additionally, SCRUFNA, like Senate Bill 3026 and House Bill
227, is underinclusive. Filing should not be the only means by which
an unwed father has standing to contest an adoption. This filed-
fathers only approach would not grant standing to the man who has
assumed actual responsibility for the pregnancy and expects to have
equitable rights to raise his child.
IX.   CONCLUSION
The issue of how much responsibility an unwed father should as-
sume before gaining full constitutional protection to establish a re-
lationship with his newborn is not easy to resolve. States vary
greatly in their approaches to deciding which fathers should be rec-
ognized as fathers and how much protection their interests deserve.
An unwed biological father’s genetic link to his child and his as-
serted intent and willingness to assume a parenting role for his
newborn should be sufficient to trigger full constitutional protection
of his inchoate interests. That constitutional protection should be
recognized and implemented by establishing a biological rights doc-
trine. When an unwed biological father contests the at-birth adop-
tion of his newborn child, he should be presumed fit to take custody
of that child. His parental rights should negate any interest the pro-
spective adoptive parents may have, and the presumption of his fit-
ness should be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. Only
the father’s demonstrated intent to assume custody of the child
should be considered. His emotional relationship with the mother
should be irrelevant. The courts are not protecting his opportunity
interest in a relationship with the mother, but the prospective rela-
tionship he seeks with his child.
The state should begin instituting the biological rights doctrine by
clarifying legislative intent and eliminating ambiguous statutory
terms that allow the judiciary to waive the biological father’s consent
based on his prenatal conduct towards the mother. In addition, the
state should establish adequate notice procedures that hold the birth
mother responsible for naming, searching for, and noticing the bio-
logical father, and make her a party to the consent-termination pro-
ceedings. All biological fathers should be required to consent to an
adoption before the state is permitted to terminate their parental
rights. The court should waive that consent only if there is clear and
convincing evidence that the father’s custody will be detrimental to
the child. “Detriment to the child” would be met by proof of the fa-
ther’s failure to provide (or attempt to provide) financial support in
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accordance with his means. Finally, if the biological father gains
knowledge of the adoption late in the proceedings, he should have a
specific period of time in which to assert his parental interest and
gain custody of the child.
These recommendations would make the rights of biological
mothers and fathers more equitable, encourage responsible fathers,
deter social engineering by the courts, protect the interests of chil-
dren subjected to adoption, and help to relieve the administrative
burden of the adoption process. Few things in life are as certain as
the biological link between a parent and child, and even fewer rights
deserve as much protection. States only do more harm when they fail
to recognize these facts.
